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Foreword
The relations between Hollywood and Europe are as old as the cinema
itself, as many authors have pointed out through very well documented
research (which will be reviewed in the following pages).
Nevertheless, the present decade, characterized by the globalization of
markets and resources, as well as the digital revolution, is witnessing a
different set of strategies.
It is not a coincidence that during the last decades several scholars have
begun to underline the internationalization of the American film industry.
One of the pioneer texts in this regard was The International Film
Industry: Western Europe and America since 1945, published by Thomas
Guback in 1969, a splendid work of research on the economic and
political relationships between Hollywood and Europe in the postwar
era. In the last ten years, this concept of ‘international Hollywood’ has
been substituted by ‘global Hollywood’ –and by extent ‘global film
industry’– and has become a central issue in recent books on the current
scenario of film production, distribution and exhibition worldwide. In
mentioning just few of them, I would like to begin with the volume
written by Colin Hoskins, Stuart McFadyen and Adam Finn (1997),
Global Television and Film: an Introduction to the Economics of the
Business, where they provide a systematic and structured economic
explanation of how the global markets for films and television operate.
The book also explains the underlying reasons for the prevalence of
American based media across the world. Three years later, Gorham
Kindem edited the International Movie Industry (2000) a comprehensive
history of one century of cinema in twenty territories, with a remarkably
conclusive chapter about the US role in the international movie industry
and the different responses to Hollywood. About the same time, Toby
Miller, Nitin Govil, John McMurria and Richard Maxwell published the
well-known Global Hollywood (2001), reedited in 2005, a thought-
provoking account of the effects of globalization and the success of the
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Hollywood cinema factory from a variety of perspectives. Finally, there
is a very recent collection of essays edited by Paul McDonald and Janet
Wasko (2008), The Contemporary Hollywood Film Industry, which
examines the US film industry as an international phenomenon from the
1980s to the present day, emphasizing the challenges of corporate
strategies for global markets. (I am leaving out here, on purpose, many
others relevant books about the political, economic, and cultural relations
between Hollywood and Europe, past and present, which will be
mentioned in the corresponding chapters).
All these books reflect in one way or another the expansion of
Hollywood all over the world as industry and market contender, as well
as the reactions from different territories defending themselves from
the American domination while, at the same time, trying to obtain
some benefit for their local film industries.
The brief text I am presenting here aspires to be just a further
contribution on how the Hollywood and the European film industries
work together in a ‘love-and-hate’ dynamics. Although my approach is
mainly based on a business management perspective, it also covers a
wider view in the way both players interact. 
This research is divided into two main sections. The first one offers a
comparative analysis of the American and the European film industries
at the present moment, preceded by a brief historical background and
followed by a summary of the strengths (Hollywood) and weaknesses
(Europe) of both film industries. The second section represents the
core of my contribution: a proposal of some cooperative and
competitive strategies currently developed by Hollywood studios and
European film companies to cohabit in a global scenario. 
At this point I shall clarify the use of some terminology. On the one
hand, I am intentionally using the term ‘Hollywood film industry’ as a
substitute for ‘American film industry’. It is true that there is a vast film
independent sector in the US but, in my view, Hollywood epitomizes
the movie industry in the US, especially from an overseas perspective.
In addition, as some authors have underlined, the borders beetween the
majors and the independents are becoming blurred (Schatz, 2008: 31-
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35). On the other hand, I am also deliberately using the term ‘European
film industry’ as a single inclusive concept. I am quite aware of the
enormous differences between the film industries in some European
countries, but at the same time there are a number of similarities that
allow us to consider the different European film industries as a whole
in comparison to the US.
The ideas and reflections I am addressing here pretend to be a
‘blueprint’ for further studies, especially in the application of the
simultaneous strategies of cooperation and competition described here
to any particular European country –or to any other territory in the
world (Asia-Pacific, Latin America, Australasia, etc.). At the same
time, some of the trends explained in these pages can be developed
further as case studies (for business management purposes).
Partial results of this research have been presented at different
international forums, such as the International Society for the Study of
European Ideas (ISSEI) in 2004, the Society of Cinema and Media
Studies (SCMS) in 2005, the World Media Economics Conference in
2006 and the annual conference on Cultural Production in a Global
Context: The Worldwide Film Industries (NYU-Stern School of
Business) in 2007. In all those meetings I received very valuable input
and feedback that allowed me to rethink, adjust and develop some of the
ideas I am discussing here. In addition, I benefited from an invitation to
attend the Annual Business and Economics Scholars Workshop Summit
in Motion Picture Industry Studies at the Carl DeSantis Business and
Economics Center for the Study and Development of the Motion Picture
and Entertainment Industry (Florida Atlantic University) in 2005. In this
sense, I would like to express my gratitude to Bruce Mallen and Rob
Davis, Director and Associate Director respectively of that Institution.
Equally, I took advantage from a stay as Visiting Researcher at the
Department of Film, TV & Digital Media, School of Theater, Film &
Television at UCLA in summer 2006. My sincere thanks to Barbara
Boyle, Dean of that Department, for her time and advice. Similarly, I am
very grateful to Gigi Johnson, former Head of the Institute of
Entertainment and Media Management, at the Anderson School of
Management (UCLA). She had the opportunity to read a germinal
version of this research and shared with me very insightful comments.
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In this same regard, I would like to acknowledge the ideas from my
colleagues of the “Europe-Hollywood” research network, and
especially to Paul McDonald, Janet Wasko, Joël Augros, Giuseppe
Delmestri, Joseph Gancarz and Peter Krämer, whose published works
have been quite inspiring to me. In addition, I want to thank my
colleagues at the School of Communication, University of Navarra, for
their support, with a special mention of Alfonso Sánchez-Tabernero
and Charo Sádaba, editors of these Media Markets Monographs series.
Finally, on a more material basis, I would like to thank Peter Yordan
for his early contributions to this research, as well as Sebastian
Kaufmann, Joseph Killoran, Javier García, Claudia Salcedo and Marta
Núñez for their assistance in the collection of data over the years. My
special thanks also to Ike Obiaya for revising the final text before
printing.
Now it is time to break into the Europe-Hollywood coopetition.
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1. Historical Background
As many authors have asserted, during the first century of the motion
picture industry, the relationship between Hollywood and Europe was
basically a dual one: economic and cultural. Nevertheless, this dual
relation was far from being balanced. On the economic side, the US
film industry has virtually no competitor among other countries.
Hollywood films dominate cinema screens all over the world,
providing a substantial margin of profits for the major studios. To
illustrate this blunt reality, it is enough to say that US films account for
an average 70% of the European market whereas, in return, European
films represent less than 5% of the North American box office
(according to the European Audiovisual Observatory data). As a
consequence, on the cultural side, Hollywood movies have efficiently
acted as disseminators of American values in every single corner of the
planet (Guback, 1969; Thomsom, 1985; De Grazia, 1989; Guback,
1969; Jarvie, 1992; Ellwood & Kroes, 1994; Segrave, 1997; Nowell-
Smith & Ricci, 1998; Higson & Maltby, 1999b; Trumpbour, 2002;
Gournay, 2002; Stokes & Maltby, 2004; Miller et al., 2005; Buquet,
2005; Elsaesser, 2005). 
To talk about the connections between Hollywood and Europe is just
about the same as to talk about Hollywood tactics in most of the world
territories. As is well known, “the US movie industry has played a
leading role internationally, stimulating many countries to adopt
protectionist measures... and marketing strategies designed to
successfully compete with Hollywood films” (Kindem, 2000a: 369-
370). The role of the European film industry as the historical rival of
Hollywood, together with the key contribution of European film
markets to the majors’ total foreign income, has forced the
development of a complex –and sometimes subtle– net of
relationships. On its part, under the flag of the national culture/heritage
defense, Europe has been obliged to take measures to preserve not only
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the existence of its film industries but a share of its film markets as
well. In response, Hollywood has reinforced even more its policy of
expansion, increasing its number of overseas productions and co-
productions while at the same time moving into European territories
through partnerships with local producers, distributors and exhibitors
(ibid.: 371-375). Therefore, whereas in the case of Hollywood the
historical evolution has been one of ‘expansion’ and ‘consolidation’,
the development of the European film industry on the contrary is more
of ‘survival’ and ‘defense’.
This is not the place to give a detailed history of the birth and
development of the film industries on both sides of the Atlantic.
Nevertheless, it is very useful to extract at least some highlights in
order to understand the current situation.
As is well known, the first movements of rivalry between Europe and
Hollywood were marked by the initial hegemony of the European
films worldwide. Until 1914 the French film industry was the most
important in the world, followed by the Italian and the Danish
(Segrave, 1997: 1-6; De Grazia, 1989: 57). Pathè Frères, for instance,
was the leading film company in the United States until 1909, with
more than 50% of the domestic market share. In addition, this French
company had offices in the main European cities as well as in New
York (Kindem, 2000a: 365). America’s reaction was not long in
coming. In 1908 the industry representatives unified forces and created
the Motion Picture Patents Corporation (MPPC) in order to face up to
the European leadership in their own territory. Two years later, they
added the distribution arm named the General Film Company. This
strategy did not last for very long –it was soon accused of monopoly–
but at least it helped them to recover their protagonism in their own
market. By 1912, 80% of domestic releases were American (Forbes &
Street, 2000: 3-25).
The struggle to conquer the international markets had just begun.
While the US was strengthening its economic power all over the
world, Europe was suffering a political and economic downfall that
would end up in the First World War. In 1914, whereas Pathé had to
dismantle his cinematographic emporium, the first seeds of the
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
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Hollywood studio system were being set up. Two years later, New
York became the new economic world capital instead of London. In
addition, the Hollywood industry could soon rely on State support.
In 1918 the movie business was declared an “essential industry” by
the American government (Segrave, 1997: 6-12). By 1917
Hollywood had climbed up to the leading position in the
international markets and was never to abandon it. Few years later,
figures were unquestionable: according to some early reports, by
1922 American movies represented 85% of the European market and
more than 90% in other territories like South America and Australia
(Segrave, 1997: 65).
The European counter-offensive at that time was very similar to
what we have seen very recently. On one hand, some Western
European countries like Germany, Great Britain and France
introduced during the 1920s several restrictive measures (mainly
quotas and tariffs) in the distribution and exhibition transactions in
order to protect their own film markets. As a consequence, the
amount of American film exports in Europe dropped significantly
whereas the number of domestic films grew together with their
popularity (Segrave, 1997: 32-46). On the other hand, during the
1920s and 1930s, Europe launched a second strategy known as the
‘Film Europe’ movement. It consisted of an attempt to create a pan-
European film production and distribution network to unify the
European film market and compete against the Hollywood
domination –not only in their own territory, but also overseas
(Higson & Maltby, 1999a: 1-31).
None of these measures managed to change the scenario in the long
run. Europe’s economic and political instability together with
Hollywood’s renewed effort to recoup its hegemony made it
impossible to consolidate these European attempts to impel a turn of
power. Quite the contrary, during the 1930s Hollywood’s foreign
grosses represented around 35% of total income. And which is more
significant, 60% of that percentage came from Europe. A report from
the US Department of Commerce published in 1939 estimated that
Hollywood accounted for 65% of the total number of theatrical
movies in the world (Thomsom, 1985: 148). On top of that, a number
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of European talents decided to emigrate to Hollywood in several
waves. There, movies were considered mainly as popular
entertainment whereas in the Old Continent cinema was becoming
more and more a political and cultural weapon, somehow distant
from audiences’ tastes. The advent of sound a few years before, and
the strategy of shooting double (or multiple) language versions of
movies was a first job opportunity for European writers, directors
and actors. A second large wave of émigrés, escaping from the Nazi
persecution, took place later on (Segrave, 1997: 1-11; 77-79; Behlil,
2007: 19-24).
Offering a balanced summary of these first decades, Victoria De
Grazia states:
To claim that the US cinema achieved a sustained advantage over
European filmmaking after 1914 is not to argue that the latter was
backward in any conventional sense… French and Italian producers
were at least as prominent as American in international markets during
the pre-1914 era… Through the interwar years, Europe –especially
central Europe– supplied Hollywood with some of its most virtuoso
performers, enterprises producers and brilliant directors. It is not
implausible that European producers on their own would eventually
have embarked on mass production… Yet even as they did so, they
acknowledged the US cinema’s supremacy and tended to identify
whatever was innovative and “modern” with American precedents (De
Grazia, 1989: 57).
Nevertheless, the closer precedents of current situation, as it is
understood today, began in the post Second World War era. The
conflict outbreak undermined the last hope of the European film
industry. When the war was ended, Hollywood found a free way to
strengthen its position in the foreign markets. In addition, it had
access to the previously self-protective Western European film
markets as part of the Marshall Plan (Jarvie, 1998: 36; Segrave, 1997:
148-149). Europe was considered a single trading zone and the US
began to act as the single most powerful nation, the world’s largest
film exporter and with a massive and lucrative domestic market
(Jarvie, 1998: 36; Nowell-Smith, 1998: 5). Among the advantages that
the American film industry had over all potential rivals on
international trade, the following, according to Jarvie, should be
underlined: a) Hollywood was an unquestionable leader in the
manufacture of popular entertainment; b) local exhibitors and
distributors were therefore favorably disposed towards American
films, not only for their higher audience appeal but also for their
competitive conditions (regular supply and better prices); c) blocked
currencies obliged Hollywood to spend on European location
shooting as well as using European talent; d) apart from that,
Hollywood had extensive investments in Europe and intended to
recover control over them (Jarvie, 1998: 44). In addition, in the
immediate postwar years, Hollywood studios sought to monopolize
control of distribution and exhibition, pressing on European
competitors through booking offices, establishing their own
distribution subsidiaries and even investing in theaters as well (De
Grazia, 1989: 58). On the contrary, as De Grazia points out, European
film industries were suffering the consequences of the war, with their
capital depleted when the US firms were emerging. In addition,
European film companies were dependent on export markets, whereas
the US ones relied on their vast home market. On top of that, wartime
regulations made it harder to respond to American competition. And
finally, European audiences’ tastes changed in favor of American
movies (De Grazia, 1989: 57-58).
As a consequence, American films returned to European screens,
under a new regime intentionally far less protectionist than the old one.
During the 1950s and 1960s the US relied on exports for more than
half of its film revenue. On the contrary, Europe didn’t manage to
achieve a significant presence in the American box office, although it
did increase the numer of film exports to the US (Guback, 1969: 37-
90; Segrave, 1997: 288). At the same time, European cinema
experienced some revival, due not only to those protectionist measures
but also by the confidence of the industry and the rise of popular
demand. Nevertheless, the conditions under which European cinemas
would emerge were still precarious. This situation obliged European
filmmakers to be innovative, seeking for new forms of storytelling. As
a consequence, some new cinematographic movements like Italian
neo-realism and the French “new wave” provided new and fresh films.
Their success helped to open a door for European cinema in the
American market (Nowell-Smith, 1998: 5).
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The bilateral agreements signed between Western European countries
(France, Italy, UK, Spain) and the US during the 1950s helped to
steadily increase the proportion of American-European co-productions.
They were also a way of accessing frozen cash (Guback, 1969: 164-
180). The so-called ‘runaway productions’ continued with few ups and
downs until the end of the 1970s. At the same time, film producers in
several European countries (notably Italy and Britain) began to explore
various forms of cooperation with American companies in the post-war
years, as happened with the Korda-Selznick collaboration, the Rank
Organization’s attempts to break into the American market and the
regular activity of Cinecittà studios in Rome, known at that time as
“Hollywood on Tiber” (Nowell-Smith, 1998: 6).
The different forms of cooperation –among European countries or
between Europe and Hollywood– from the 1950s onwards led to the
recognition that the individual markets of European countries were
too small to support viable national film industries. In addition, big-
budget movies required a co-production effort. The need for
cooperative strategies became even more urgent with the advent of
television. In this sense, European film industries reacted against TV
competition as Hollywood did, by making more spectacular films
(Guback, 1969: 181-197; Nowell-Smith, 1998: 5).
Finally, the second half of the 1960s witnessed a large succession of
business operations on a great scale that threw the historical
Hollywood majors –in a difficult financial situation– into the hands of
big corporations not directly related to the entertainment business.
These movements in the industry coincided in time with the rapid
emergence of the “New Hollywood”, characterized by a director-
driven, youth-oriented, unconventional cinema. This independent
spirit, in connection with the recovery of the mainstream moviegoer
ended up with the beginning of the ‘blockbuster era’ in mid 1970s
(Schatz, 2008: 18-21). 
Meanwhile, European film industries, which had experienced a
revival during the 1950s and 1960s –thanks to the American
investment–, entered into a situation of crisis in the 1970s, prompted
by a declining audience, the shrinking of cinema facilities, the
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exhaustion of the co-production formula, the fragmentation of the
production sector and the reduction of distribution companies,
unable to counterbalance Hollywood domination (Degand, 1978:
39-40). This decline coincided with a change in both official and
unofficial government policy in a number of countries. From 1960s
onwards, several European countries (France, Italy and Germany)
moved to more targeted support mechanisms (Nowell-Smith, 1998:
10-11). As a consequence, the traditional European popular cinema
was substituted by the subsidized art film. American companies took
advantage from this situation and consolidated their presence in
Europe through their distribution subsidiaries. As a part of their
strategy, they increased their investment to acquire and to finance
European films, especially in France, Italy and the United Kingdom
(Guback, 1974: 2-6).
From the 1980s onwards, the tendency of concentration and
diversification through mergers, conglomerates, and multinational
corporations in the US was accentuated. This time the reason was not
exclusively financial but mainly strategic, in view of the new
multimedia landscape. More in detail, the most significant
development of the studios during these years in terms of structure
and business plan was towards synergy and diversification.
According to film historian Thomas Schatz, Hollywood studios were
trying “to become more efficient multi-faceted media corporations,
focusing on their filmed entertainment divisions while taking full
advantage of new delivery systems and revenue streams” (Schatz,
2008: 22). This same author explains how this process of
transformation went a step further during the 1990s, and the New
Hollywood was substituted by “Conglomerate Hollywood”, “as the
logic of synergy and tight diversification met the larger forces of
globalization, digitization, and US media deregulation” (ibid.: 25).
As a result, a new strain of media giants –AOL Time-Warner, Sony-
Columbia, News Corporation-Fox, Viacom-Paramount and Disney-
Capital Cities/ABC, NBC-Universal– took command of the
Hollywood film industry, becoming the dominant force in a rapidly
expanding global entertainment industry (Balio, 1998: 61-68; Wasko,
2003: 59-78).
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Europe reacted in a similar way, although on a lesser scale. Some
European conglomerates were formed –the former Kirch Group,
Berterlsmann, Canal Plus, RTL, Finninvest– and even dared to break
into Hollywood’s ownership (the former Vivendi-Universal) as a sort
of vengeful strategy (Pardo, 2002: 20-25). In addition, a few
European film companies managed to have an international impact,
as happened with Le Studio Canal Plus and Polygram (Miller et al.,
2005: 184-204).
In addition, during the 1990s, new efforts to identify and resolve the
main deficits of the film industry were undertaken, with the support of
some pan-European initiatives –Eurimages and Media Program. In this
regard, a new European Union Audiovisual Policy was established and
it contributed towards dealing with some challenges (Jäckel, 2003: 68-
90; Henning & Alpar, 2005). 
The global economic significance of the audiovisual sector was
confirmed by the GATT negotiations in 1993. Whereas the Americans
sought a deregulation of the European market –an abolition of quotas
and subsidies– in cause of free trade, the Europeans defended the so-
called ‘cultural exception’. This year also marked a turning point in
Hollywood revenues, bigger overseas that at home for the first time
(Forbes & Street, 2000: 24).
Since then onwards, Hollywood and Europe have been trying to
consolidate their positions according to the new global map. Thus, as
some authors point out,
The traditional argument between European and American film
industries has been transformed in the 1990s into an argument about
who would secure the multi-billion dollar profits from world-media
domination, in which cinema plays a small but significant part (Forbes
& Street, 2000: 24).
Nowadays, more than half of the top ten media conglomerates are
American and each one of them owns a Hollywood major, as it is
showed in table 1 (EAO, 2005b: 28)
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Table 1. 
Top 10 Worldwide Media Companies by Turnover (US $ millions)
Notes:
1 Blockbuster Inc. was deconsolidated from Viacom in 2004.
2 Warner Music Group was sold in 2003 and is not included in Time Warner turnover.
3 Vivendi sold Universal in 2004. NBC-Universal is ranked as a separated company.
4 Since September 2003, QVC is consolidated in Liberty Media Corp.
Source: EAO, 2005: 28.
The situation of US supremacy is even more evident if we consider that
these multimedia groups are responsible for 80% of the movies, 70% of
TV fiction and 50% of the recorded music produced in the whole world
(Dale, 1997: 10; Scott, 2005: 163-166). According to data offered by the
European Audiovisual Observatory, the imbalance of trade in films and
television programs between North America and Europe in the period
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Rank Company Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 Activites
1. Walt 
Disney
(ABC)
US 18,168 18,864 20,649 23,002 Film, Video,
TV, Music,
Theme Parks
2. Viacom 
(Paramount)1
US 18,046 18,858 19,758 21,374 Film, Video,
TV
3. Time
Warner2
US 19,845 21,900 10,401 20,907 Film, Video,
TV, Music,
Theme Parks
4. Sony
(Columbia)
JP (US) 19,161 20,151 20,159 16,006 Film, Video,
Music
5. Vivendi-
Universal3
FR (US) 14,733 19,058 19,860 15,494 Film, Video,
Music
6. News 
Corporation
(Fox)
AUS
(US) 8,318 10,183 11,739 14,417 Film, Video,TV, Music
7. NBC/
Universal
US 5,769 7,149 6,900 12,900 Film, Video,
TV
8. The Direct
TV Group
US 6,280 7,121 8,292 11,360 TV
9. Bertelsmann DE 6,566 7,420 9,047 10,113 TV, Music
10. Liberty 
Media
Group-QVC4
US 2,059 1,804 3,783 7,682 TV
1995-2000 increased substantially. In this period, the sales of US
companies in the EU increased from US$ 5,331 million to 9,031 million
(+69.4), whereas the EU revenues in North America grew only from
US$ 518 million to 827 million (+59.7). The total EU deficit increased
from US$ 4,813 to 8,204 million (+70.5) (EAO, 2003: 36). Not without
reason, Jean Chalaby has defined this situation of American pre-
eminence as one of “cultural primacy” –instead of “cultural
imperialism”, which implies more ideological connotations (Chalaby,
2006). As this same author assesses, under this new global scenario the
interaction between Hollywood and Europe is becoming more intense. 
All US media conglomerates have set their eyes on international
expansion and seek to increase their own out-of-home revenue.
Hybridization is a key to the success of this strategy (Chalaby, 2006:
46)… American companies owe their continuing presence in the
region to their understanding and adaptation to European cultures,
establishing bases across the continent and hiring European staff
(ibid.: 48). 
At the same time, European interests are becoming more and more
global, not only from the financial perspective, but also from the
creative one. European monies feeding US companies’ coffers in
different forms have been quite regular (Miller et al., 2005: 184-204;
Gubbins, 2007b), as well as the presence of European talent in
Hollywood (Goodridge, 2000). Thus, during the present decade the old
rivalry has apparently been put aside in favor of subtle forms of
cooperation and competition, as we will see later on. 
Some of the factors explaining Hollywood’s dominance over the
European film industry and market will be developed in the following
pages. Nevertheless, in order to rely on the adequate framework, it is
convenient to obtain first a comparative picture of both film industries.
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2. Face to Face: Comparative Analysis
by Sector 
Over the last ten years Europe has seen an amazing level of activity,
with investment and production skyrocketing and with industry and the
state joining forces to promote European film more intensely than ever
before. Nevertheless, as has been mentioned before, Hollywood
remains firmly entrenched as the dominant force in the European film
industry. The evolution of the film industry sectors –production,
distribution and exhibition– in both territories along the last decade,
together with the main industry and market indicators, are eloquent
enough to draw a comparative analysis.
2.1. Production
On the Production side, the number of movies produced by the US and
Europe was quite similar one decade ago –between 600 and 800 films
per year. Nevertheless, the turn of the decade has witnessed a clear
turning point. Whereas the European film industry has grown
spectacularly surpassing the barrier of 1,000 productions per year
(1,371 in the whole continent), the US has scaled down to less than 480
(Screen Digest, 2007a: 206).
On a worldwide basis, film production hit 4,858 feature films in 2006
–a steady 4.6% increase on the previous year and the most recent peak
for the world feature output. This increase was led by Asia
–particularly Far East–, where as much as 2,481 films were produced
(51% of world film production), followed by Europe (28.2%). The US
represents only a tiny 9.8% of total film production in the world
(Screen Digest, 2007a: 205).
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Figure 1. 
Europe vs. USA: Film Productions per Year (1996-2006)
Note: EU accounts for 15 countries from 1996 to 2002, and for 25 from 2003 onwards.
Source: Screen Digest.
These figures must be put in relation with the average budget per
picture –which reflects the annual film investment in each territory.
Here the US presents a very significant leadership. In the period
1996-2006, the US has experienced a significant increment in
annual investment in film production –from US$ 8.7 to 14.7 billion,
which accounts for 59.6% of world total investment. European effort
has been proportionally even larger, although on a lesser scale –from
US$ 2.3 to 5.8 billion, which represents 23.7% of worldwide
investment.
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Figure 2. 
Europe vs. USA: Annual Investment in Film Production (1996-2006)
Note: EU accounts for 15 countries from 1996 to 2002, and for 25 from 2003 onwards.
Source: Screen Digest and MPA.
Regarding the average cost per picture, whereas in Europe this has
remained very regular over the last decade (from US$ 3.6 to 4.3
million taking into account the whole continent, and from US$ 4.4
to 5.2 million in respect to EU members), in the case of US it has
been skyrocketing, from US$ 11 to 30 million if we include all the
film producing sector (major companies and independents); and
from US$ 39.8 to 65.8 million in the case of the Hollywood studios
(see figure 3). The main conclusion that can be drawn at this point
is quite clear: the US produces fewer movies but with higher
budgets, which means more competitive products for an
oversaturated market.
Figure 3. 
Europe vs. USA: Average Budgets (1996-2006)
Note: EU accounts for 15 countries from 1996 to 2002, and for 25 from 2003 onwards.
Source: Screen Digest and MPA.
It must be underlined that, in the case of the American film industry,
the first 100 movies at the box-office achieve around 70% of the total
domestic grosses; while, at the same time, every year about 250 films
do not reach theatrical exhibition. In addition, close to 200 titles –in
fact, the most successful ones– are exported to the foreign markets
(Buquet, 2005: 23). In the case of Europe, only one third of the films
released make a profit, and only 2 out of 5 pull even (Adler, 2003). In
this regard, heavily marketed films tend to make more profits, and
Hollywood’s marketing budgets can be 20 times bigger than those of
European films.
From the income point of view, the American audiovisual industry
usually doubles the European one. In the respective domestic theatrical
market, the total gross for the US film industry in 2000 was more than
€ 20,000 million whereas in Europe it was close to € 10,000 million.
Regarding the film exports, that year the US film industry obtained €
8,000 million out of the European market. On the contrary, the
commercial deficit of the European Union in relation with the US was
more than € 7,000 million (Buquet, 2005: 64-65).
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Table 2. 
Top 10 European Film Companies by Operating Revenues in 
€ thousand (Exhibition excluded)
Notes: 
1 TV turnover not included.
2 TV turnover not included.
3 Exhibition turnover (Europalaces) not included.
Source: Adapted from EAO, 2006: 113.
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Rank Company Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Sectors
1. Walt Dis-
ney Inter-
national
GB 1,236,098 1,302,582 1,162,078 1,376,124 n/a Rights, 
Distrib
(Film & 
Video)
2. United 
Internatio-
nal 
Pictures
NL 882,059 420,086 538,880 634,938 818,424 Distrib
(Film)
3. Warner
Bros. 
Entertain-
ment UK
GB 329,243 474,334 625,851 553,402 n/a Distrib
(Film)
4. Embassy 
Eagle 
Holdings
NL 324,441 299,590 501,377 257,762 522,999 Prod, 
Distrib
(Film)
5. Groupe 
Canal
Plus1
FR 430,000 455,000 351,000 394,000 n/a Rights,
Prod,
Distrib
(Film &
Video)
6. Warner
Bros. 
Entertain-
ment
GmbH
DE n/a n/a 360,685 434,784 n/a Distrib
(Film)
7. Warner
Bros.
France
FR 249,794 275,306 401,351 396,149 413,852 Distrib
(Film)
8 . RAI 
Cinema2
IT 289,835 319,203 311,252 298,546 386,794 Rights,
Prod
9. Group 
Pathé3
FR 350,000 348,699 250,981 355,272 254,763 Rights,
Prod,
Distrib
(Film &
Video),
TV
10. Twentieh
Century-
Fox Home
Entert.
GB 200,241 246,979 300,567 n/a n/a Distrib 
(Video)
Another relevant data referred to the European film production sector
is that 24 out of the top 50 European film companies (exhibitors
excluded) are subsidiaries of the Hollywood majors –5 out of the first
10 (EAO, 2006: 113-114), as table 2 shows.
2.2. Distribution
Regarding the Distribution sector, the different levels of
fragmentation in the US and Europe should first of all be stressed.
Whereas in the US there are approximately 180 active theatrical
distribution companies (seven big Hollywood studios and about 175
independent firms associated under the AFMA umbrella), the
overall number in Europe is close to 830, 646 belonging to the EU
(25) members and, within this group, more than half (375)
concentrated in the five big Western European countries (Lange,
Newman-Baudais, & Hugot, 2007: 9).
In this sector, especially, the dominant position of American
companies in Europe can be traced. A recent study conducted in 2005
by the European Audiovisual Observatory, among a population of 435
film distribution companies, presented the following typology: 393
companies (85.8%) were under European control, 55 (12.1%) were
controlled by US majors and 9 (1.9%) depended on investors from
other parts of the world (Lange, Newman-Baudais, & Hugot, 2007:
15). Significantly, 20 out of those 55 US-controlled distributors are
ranked among the top 40 leading film distributors in Europe for the
period 2001-2005 (EAO, 2006: 120) –6 out of the top 10, as table 3
reflects.
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Table 3. 
Top 10 European Film Distributors by Operating Revenues 
(in € thousands)
Source: EAO, 2006: 120.
This supremacy is also reflected in box office terms. On average, five
Hollywood companies –until recently, UIP acted as distributor for
Universal, Paramount and Dreamworks– controlled about 65% of the
European distribution market for the period 2002-05, as figure 4
illustrates, leaving a scarce 35% to be shared by a number of European
independent distributors.
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Rank Company Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1. United Internatio-
nal Pictures
NL 882,059 420,086 538,880 634,938 818,424
2. Warner Bros. 
Entertainment UK GB 329,243 474,334 625,851 553,402 n/a
3. Warner Bros. 
Entertainment
GmbH
DE n/a n/a 360,685 434,784 n/a
4. Warner Bros. 
France
FR 249,794 275,306 401,351 396,149 413,852
5. Sony Pictures 
Releasing GmbH
DE 193,121 257,473 284,460 251,696 n/a
6. Metropolitan Film 
Export
FR 150,483 145,089 181,513 190,012 190,421
7. Pathé Distribution
(AMLF)
FR 50,393 120,789 86,563 260,941 180,367
8. The Walt Disney
Company Iberia
ES 137,677 179,600 184,303 253,870 169,624
9. Entertainment
Film Distributors
GB 127,845 182,287 187,747 180,927 153,643
10. Columbia Pictures
Corporation
GB 62,522 134,877 112,692 142,147 147,909
Figure 4. 
European Film Distribution Market: Breakdown by Companies 
(Average 2002-05)
Source: Own elaboration on EAO data.
This panorama by itself speaks of a high concentration in this sector,
both in Europe and in the US. An examination of the situation on some
European individual markets highlights even more this concentration of
revenues around the leading distributors. For instance, on the five larger
markets –France, UK & Ireland, Germany, Italy & Spain–, the top ten
distributors (which includes both subsidiaries of US majors as well as
European companies in each case) account for 91% of admissions and
43% of new releases on average (Lange, Newman-Baudais, & Hugot,
2007: 11).
The situation in the US is even more accentuated. As figure 5 shows,
six major companies account for 77.8% of the domestic market on
average for the period 2005-07, without taking into consideration that
among those “others” there are some “independent brands” related to
the main studios like Miramax (Disney), New Line (Warner) or Fox
Searchlight (Fox).
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Figure 5. 
US Film Distribution Market: Breakdown by Companies 
(Average 2005-07)
Source: Own elaboration on Box Office Mojo data.
2.3. Exhibition
To give a first general comparative view between Europe and the US
in the Exhibition segment –with regard to number of screens,
admissions and box office revenues–, as Screen Digest indicates, North
America (US and Canada) accounted for 28% of screens, 20.1% of
admissions and 41.1% of box office revenues in 2005. On its part,
Europe was responsible of 22.4% of screens, 13.4% of admissions and
30% of box office revenues (Screen Digest, 2006b: 333).
Although the amount of cinemas has been reduced in the last decades,
the number of screens has steadily increased, both in the US and
Europe (see figure 6). In this respect, the US has passed from 110.3
screens per million heads of the population in 1996 to 128.2 in 2006,
whereas the EU has gone from 52 screens to 64.2 in the same period
(Screen Digest, 2007b: 304). In order to perceive the significant
difference between the American and the European theatrical markets
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–in terms of market size and potential–, the number of screens must be
put in relation with the admissions (figure 7).
Figure 6. 
Europe vs. USA: Screens (1996-2006)
Source: Screen Digest.
Figure 7. 
Europe vs. USA: Admissions (in millions) (1996-2006)
Note: EU accounts for 15 countries from 1996 to 2002, and for 25 from 2003 onwards.
Source: Screen Digest.
As can be observed, the US has scaled down from more than 1,600
tickets sold in 2002 to more than 1,400 in 2006. On its part, Europe has
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suffered a slighter decline of its cinema audience. In any case, the gap
of about 400,000 admissions between both territories has been regular.
Apart from the bigger number of screens, the US citizen is a much
more frequent cinemagoer than her European counterpart. Whereas the
annual frequency per capita in the case of the US was 4.78 in 2006, the
average in Europe was only 2.20.
Figure 8. 
Europe vs. USA: Annual Frequency Per Capita (1996-2006)
Note: EU accounts for 15 countries from 1996 to 2002, and for 25 from 2003 onwards.
Source: MPAA and Media Salles.
Box office revenues from cinemas worldwide have achieved a ceiling of
about US$ 25 billion approximately in the last years. There is a
significant concentration of the theatrical grosses on few successful titles.
In 2005, 24.9% of the world’s box office was accounted for by the 10 top-
grossing films –this figure was of 22.9% for 2006– and the majority of
them were one hundred per cent American (Screen Digest, 2006d: 210).
On the other hand, in relation to the box office, there is a clear imbalance
between Europe and US. Around 68.6% of the European film market
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(admissions) belongs to American movies, whereas European films only
manage to achieve 5.6% of the US market as figures 9a and 9b shows. As
will be addressed later on, there are a some movies produced in Europe
with US investment –generally quite successful at the box office– that for
the purpose of this statistic count as European productions. In other words,
without taking into account these film productions, the market share of
European movies (in Europe and in the US) would be even smaller. 
Figure 9a. 
Europe vs. USA: Market Share by Admissions (EU Film Market)
Source: Own elaboration on EAO data. Percentage of EU films for 2005 and 2006 in-
clude some UK-US co-productions.
Figure 9b. 
Europe vs. USA: Market Share by Admissions (US Film Market)
Source: Own elaboration on EAO data. Percentage of EU films for 2005 and 2006 in-
clude some UK-US co-productions.
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To complete the conclusion drawn before, the US produces fewer films
with higher budgets which are addressed not only to a bigger domestic
market (number of screens, annual frequency per capita and total
admissions), but also to an international market eager to receive
Hollywood blockbusters. Whereas Hollywood studios got almost 58%
of total revenues (theatrical) from the international markets on average
in the period 2001-06, films from the European Union only got 32% of
admissions from the EU market between 2000 and 2005 (see figures
10a and 10b).
Figure 10a. 
Europe vs. USA: B.O. Percentage of US Films in Foreign Markets
Source: Own elaboration on MPAA data.
Figure 10b. 
Europe vs. USA: Admissions Percentage of EU Films in EU Markets
Source: Own elaboration on EAO data. 
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Finally, let us pay attention to the analysis of the Exhibition sector
from the company point of view. In the US market, consolidation
continued to occur among the top-ranked exhibitors. In relation to
international markets, the retrenchment of US firms has continued in
the last years, especially in Asia-Pacific. In Europe, venture capital
firms have invested heavily in a bid to streamline existing operations,
particularly in UK and Spain, and mirroring the situation in North
America. Following considerable change at the top of Europe’s
largest cinema chains in the last years, the degree of corporate
activity has slowed to a certain extent (Screen Digest, 2006b: 334-
335; Screen Digest, 2007b: 303).
We should also remark that the multiplex boom has had a mixed effect
on the European film industry. Attendance has exploded, but the huge
increase in available screens hasn’t resulted in a hoped-for increase in
European films being shown. After its initial success the screen boom
has begun to oversaturate the exhibition market, as screen construction
grows at a far faster rate than audiences do. This has caused fierce
competition among exhibitors for smaller profits. At the same time the
glut of movie production in Europe makes it harder than ever for
distributors to make profits, because there are not enough screens
available to show all the movies made.
In a clear difference from the Production and Distribution sectors, the
US is hardly present among the top leading exhibition companies in
Europe. Only 2 out of the top 30 are Hollywood subsidiaries (EAO,
2006: 123), none of them in the top 10, as table 4 reflects.
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Table 4. 
Top 10 European Film Exhibitors by Operating Revenues 
(in € thousands)
Notes: 
1 Data from 2001 to 2003 belong to United Cinemas International Multiplex N.V. (NL)
and data for 2005, to United Cinema International Acquisitions (UK).
2 In 2004 Terra Firma acquired Odeon Equity Co.
3 In 2004, Cineworld acquired sole control of UGC Cinema Holding.
Source: Adapted from EAO, 2006: 123.
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Rank Company Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1. United Cinemas 
International1
NL/GB 494,057 457,652 409,162 n/a 474,841
2. Terra Filma Inves-
tments (Odeon)2
GB 254,042 n/a n/a 402,454 n/a
3. Cineworld
Group3
DE 188,182 n/a n/a 54,513 397,369
4. Europalaces FR 351,000 374,301 380,019 407,728 381,237
5. UGC FR 392,054 331,426 315,442 198,642 n/a
6. Kinepolis BE 221,484 213,474 198,072 203,386 194,643
7. Constantin 
Kinobetriebe
GmbH
DE 127,306 131,214 114,316 246,915 190,000
8. CinemaxX AG DE 214,334 207,332 187,093 188,148 n/a
9. VUE Cinemas
(UK)
GB 73,361 105,631 121,930 140,321 136,267
10. CGR Cinemas FR 87,100 95,861 99,661 103,541 109,597
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3. Factors to Explain Hollywood’s 
Supremacy
The previous chapter has illustrated, as a general overview, the current
scenario of the European and the US film industries and markets. Now
it is time to point out, in a more systematic way, the main competitive
differences between both contenders.
During the last decades, a number of authors have addressed this
issue (De Grazia, 1989; Dale, 1997; Hoskins, McFadyen, & Finn,
1997; Litman, 1998; Augros, 2000; Kindem, 2000b; Jäckel, 2003;
Wasko, 2003; Buquet, 2005; Miller et al., 2005; Scott, 2005;
McDonald & Wasko, 2008b). Janet Wasko, for example, in trying to
explain why Hollywood dominates the world film markets, offers a
multiple perspective based on historical, cultural, political and
economic factors. Using her approach as a basis, and completing the
correspondent features with other contributions, I am summarize the
most significant issues in the table 5.
This table presents in a concise way some of the principal differences
between both industries and, by extension, the reasons for an ongoing
imbalance. Therefore, it acts as an ideal framework for analyzing them
comparatively.
Let us comment further on some of these features in order to add
more insights. As we have paid brief attention to the historical
factors, I will concentrate on some of the remaining aspects –with a
special emphasis on business management issues, as the core
approach of this text.
Table 5. 
Hollywood vs. Europe
Source: Own elaboration on Wasko (2003), Kindem (2000a), Trumpbour (2002), Miller
et al. (2005), Elsaesser (2005), and other sources.
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HOLLYWOOD EUROPE
Historical
Factors
• Commercially oriented industry
from the very beginning
(entertainment).
• Benefited from World Wars.
• After a initial commercial impulse,
soon became more artistically and
politically oriented (work of art,
propaganda).
• Damaged by the World Wars.
Cultural
Factors
• U.S. as a nation of immigrants.
Universal appeal of film stories.
• Ideology of optimism and hope.
Escapism and happy endings
(‘dream factory’).
• ‘Americanization’ of international
audiences’ taste; driven by star-
system.
• Access to audiences through
advertising and marketing.
• Circuits: Multiplex, Commercial
TV.
• National cultural boundaries.
Different audiences.
• Tragic realism, pessimism,
existentialism.
• ‘Auteurism’ (driven by authors) and
distance from European audiences’
taste.
• Access to audiences through film
critics.
• Circuits: Art-house, Public TV.
Economic
Factors
• Industrial mode of production
(film as standardized commodity).
• Serially produced (studio system)
• Free trade model economy.
Financed by private and risk
capital.
• Economies of scale through
vertical integration, industry
concentration, and diversification.
• Large and wealthy home market.
• Conquest of foreign markets.
International distribution system.
Unfair distribution and exhibition
practices.
• Artisanal mode of production (film as
a unique work of art).
• Independently produced, on one-off
basis.
• Mixed-model. Public funds
(subsidized).
• Not economy of scale. Inexistence of
a united European film industry. 
• Fragmented market. Failure in creating
a common European film market.
• Failure at conquering international
markets. Difficulty to offer cross-
border films. Lack of pan-European
distributors.
Political
Factors
• Politics based primarily on
economic factors.
• State intervention: effective
industry-government alliances.
Movies as strategic industry
(money and power).
• Offensive rather than defensive
politics: ‘Selling America to the
world’: film as international
medium. U.S. ambassadors for
trade and democracy.
• Politics based primarily on cultural
factors.
• State intervention: protectionist
measures (both supportive and
restrictive). Movies as cultural
industry.
• Defensive rather than offensive
politics: Major efforts trying to avoid
US cultural dominance instead of
selling national culture to the world.
3.1. Hollywood’s Competitive Advantages
Among the reasons for the US film industry’s competitive position
over the European one from the economic point of view the following
should be mentioned:
• Increasing efficiencies and economies of scale achieved through
vertical integration (mainly production plus distribution, and in
some cases also exhibition circuits), industrial concentration, and
diversification through mergers, conglomerates, and multinational
corporations. Other key features include trans-nationalization of
ownership, global dispersal of production and the freelance market
for creative and craft labor (Kindem, 2000a: 367; McDonald &
Wasko, 2008a: 4). As a consequence, as indicated before, American
conglomerates dominate the world film industry (Chalaby, 2006).
• The existence of a large and wealthy home market, which allows
the industry to recoup a significant part of its investment in its own
territory (Hoskins, McFadyen, & Finn, 1997: 38).
• The increasing importance of international markets for Hollywood
studios’ global turnover. Currently, between 50% and 60% of
Hollywood’s theatrical grosses come from the international market
(Trumpbour, 2008). Consequently, Hollywood has reinforced its
appeal to foreign audiences through the importation of foreign
talent and the so-called ‘runaway productions’ (Kindem, 2000a:
368; Wasko, 2003: 174). 
• In relation to the previous point, huge marketing and distribution
costs –both in domestic and foreign markets– and relevance of
market research in order to design effective marketing campaigns
(Drake, 2008). According to the Motion Pictures Association of
America (MPAA), marketing costs (prints and advertising) of an
average Hollywood movie have escalated from US$ 19.8 million in
1996 to US$ 35.9 million in 2007 (MPAA, 2007: 2).
• Film as a multiplatform commodity, based on ‘high concept’
elements and with franchise potential. A Hollywood movie is no
longer just a movie, but also a product suitable for all kind of
commercial windows. In this sense, the Hollywood film industry
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fundamentally remains in the business of exploiting intellectual
property rights (McDonald & Wasko, 2008a: 6-7; Bettig, 2008;
Wyatt, 1994).
• The universal appeal of American stories and American values. The
tastes of worldwide audiences have been ‘americanized’, thanks to
the classic narrative structure and filmmaking style of Hollywood
films, together with their powerful marketing machinery (Miller et
al., 2005: 5; Trumpbour, 2008).
• The creation of a ‘star system’, as a key tool to attract audiences from
all over the world. In this sense Hollywood stardom remains as a sign
of commercial value in cinema and popular culture, controlled by a
small clusters of firms (agencies) (McDonald, 2008).
• State/industry partnership, and, more in detail, the alliance between
the MPAA and the US Department of Commerce. Very early on,
the film industry was declared a ‘strategic industry’ by the
American government. Since then, Hollywood has received
constant support from the political sphere (Pendakur, 2008).
• Questionable trade practices and policies used by US distributors in
international distribution and exhibition agreements. Apart from
abusive demands in sharing box office grosses –mostly in the cases
of big blockbusters– as well as blind-bidding and block-booking
practices in exhibition, they have restricted the exhibitors’ freedom
by overlapping in contracts concerning systems of liquidation,
pricing, collections, control of ticket sales, advertising of films,
selection of theatres, time of exhibition and the delivery and return
of copies –in some cases acting as a cartel in a given country
(Pardo, 2002: 61-62; Frater, 2004).
3.2. Europe’s Weaknesses
In clear contrast to the Hollywood approach to film business, European
cinema suffers from several endemic illnesses, such as the following:
• ‘Auteurism’ or the celebration of the director as the main (and
sometimes unique) artist, making films that rarely garner enough of
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an audience to recoup their investment. In this sense, films are
mainly understood as an artwork with clear cultural implications.
This approach has the danger of converting European cinema into
a ‘cultural ghetto’ (Dale, 1997: 165-181; Vincendeau, 1998: 444-
445; Jäckel, 2003: 28-29).
• A lack of business sense, which leads to a wrong economic and
commercial approach: instead of matching ‘budgets to markets’ (or
costs to revenues), the European film industry is used to matching
budgets to easily available funds, mainly subsidies and television
pre-sales. The negative effects are, on one hand a certain ‘subsidy
mentality’ believed to create non-commercial, non-competitive
productions; on the other, to focus on stories excessively oriented
to television audiences (Illot, 1996: 2-3; Dale, 1997:182-224).
• Whereas Hollywood studios, thanks to their higher degree of
vertical integration and economies of scale, have various sources of
finance and income and can be therefore more flexible with their
cash-flow projections, invest more in development and marketing
and sustain a reasonable number of failures, European producers
usually work on a single project without having the resources to
develop new projects nor investing in marketing. Thus, the risk is
much higher (Janiesch, 1993: 23-25, Dale, 1997:182-224).
• In relation with the previous points, there are no regular and
efficient financing sources, especially from private capital funds.
Tax-shelter schemes and risk-capital firms only operate in some
countries and/or for a specific budget-level project. In this sense,
the financing situation of the European film industry tends to be
fragile and inconsistent for many producers (Janiesch, 1993: 23-25;
Coopers & Lybrand, 1992; IMCA, 2002). 
• High fragmentation in the production sector, which leads to a low
output of film productions per company. According to some
estimates, 80% of EU production companies do not accomplish
more than one film per year. This means that average European
producers cannot rely on strong production structures –like the
Hollywood system– to make movies on a regular basis. In fact,
some production firms are created on a project basis, to cash in on
grants and subsidies (Henning & Alpar, 2005: 235-236).
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• Little attention to the development phase of filmmaking. Too many
European projects enter into production without having undergone
a thorough development process (script rewriting) and financial
strategy (business plan). This in turn hampers marketability and
economic viability. On average, the European audiovisual industry
invests less than 5% of production investment totals in a given
project, compared with 10% invested in the United States (Finney,
1996: 1-8; Pardo, 2002: 52-53). 
• A fragmented market that is very difficult to treat as a whole.
Linguistic and cultural barriers impede the smooth and regular
travel of European films (Janiesch, 1993: 25-26; Henning & Alpar,
2005: 238). Only 20% of the films annually produced in Europe
achieve distribution outside the main country of production, which
represents only a 7% share of the market (Fattorossi, 2000). In the
case of EU produced films, they achieve an average 35% of grosses
in other EU countries outside national market (EAO, 2006: 71).
• Distribution is the weakest sector of the European film industry,
and the low level of vertical integration makes the development of
integrated strategies for commercial exploitation difficult. Europe
is still very fractured, despite its political unification, and audiences
have little taste for other European cinema, especially from small
countries. European producers do not have much negotiation
leverage when faced with the US distributors’ considerable power
in selecting the type of movies to distribute and market. This
creates the necessity for strong European distribution.
Nevertheless, pan-European distributors have never managed to
survive. Hollywood also seeks to buy off especially successful
local distributors, and it usually succeeds (Buquet, 2005: 279-280;
Henning & Alpar, 2005: 236; Lange, Newman-Baudais, & Hugot,
2007: 9-12). A significant percentage of European films do not
have a theatrical release in their own territory within one year of
production –between 50% and 60% of British films, 30% of
German and Italian films, around 25% in the case of Spanish and
French films (Jäckel, 2003: 99-100; 137-138).
• In addition to this, there is also a lack of investment in distribution
and marketing costs –prints and advertising– as a consequence of
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film companies’ lack of capitalization. Across Europe, it is
common for promotional costs to outweigh print costs in the
distributor’s outgoings for a film campaign. Generally speaking,
the average release promotion costs for a blockbuster in Europe
runs from € 400,000 to 2 million, whereas an independent movie
can be in the region of € 15,000-400,000, a figure very far away
from the US$ 25-39 million in the case of an average Hollywood
movie (Screen Digest, 2006a, 2006c; Finney, 1993).
• Misdirected and/or inadequate protectionist measures at the
European level, especially those regarding direct subsidies instead
of incentives. Generally speaking, most of the public aids are
production-oriented instead of distribution-oriented. The
relationship between cultural values and market competition
remains highly contentious in the context of European film policies
(Jäckel, 2003: 88-89; Herold, 2004; Henning & Alpar, 2005).
• Lastly, the lack of a European ‘star system’ makes difficult the
international appeal of movies led by European actors and
actresses, although it is true at the same time that some European
film directors work as ‘brand names’ internationally (Europa-
Cinemas, 2006: 21, 23). In this regard, as will be addressed later,
some European talents have emigrated to Hollywood and they have
built up their international stardom there.
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4. Coopetition: Theoretical Framework
The perennial relationship of cooperation and competition between
Hollywood and other territories overseas has called the attention, in
one way or in another, of several authors from different fields. Some of
them, with a background in film studies, have specifically addressed
the interaction between Hollywood and Europe as rivals or contenders.
Others, from a geographical-organizational basis, have studied the
process of decentralization of film production (‘runaway productions’)
and the internationalization of capital and human resources, where
Europe is playing a crucial role for the Hollywood studios. Finally, I
am including the main contributions of some business management
experts who have directly addressed the issue of ‘coopetition’ in the
case of multinational companies in a global scenario.
4.1. Film Studies Approach
From the cinema studies field, in recent times, several authors have
remarked on the Europe-Hollywood interaction, with more or less
emphasis. This is the case of Andrew Higson (2000), Mike Wayne
(2002) and Thomas Elsaesser (2005) among others. Without
specifically approaching this issue from a business perspective, these
scholars have identified some of the economic and managerial
strategies derived from the obliged coexistence of both film industries.
In his chapter about the British film industry included in the volume
The International Movie Industry (2000), edited by Gorham Kindem,
Andrew Higson differentiates three economic strategies adopted by the
United Kingdom in response to American cinema’s domination: a)
collusion with Hollywood in distribution and exhibition agreements;
b) competition in the international market, through the production of
high-standard films; and c) product differentiation in the domestic
territory, promoting local cinema. He then adds a fourth one (d)
referred to those attempts to create similar economies of scale via
international cooperation among European countries (Higson, 2000:
240-241). Not without irony, this author argues that “these policies
have rarely been developed for purely patriotic reasons: Increased
profitability for British companies has always been at least as
prominent a goal” (ibid.: 240).
In relation to collusion, Higson points out as an example the deals
between British exhibitors and American distributors to exploit the UK
market in a joint enterprise –in other words, British companies
circulating American films– as well as British firms encouraging
American majors to buy shares in their outfits (ibid.).
Regarding the direct competition to challenge American market
supremacy, Higson mentions the production of Hollywood-style
international films by larger British companies. Nevertheless, he
rapidly unveils the collateral damages implicit in this strategy:
Ironically, such companies could invest profits gained from the
distribution and exhibition of American films in expensive
productions designed to break into the American market. Ideally, the
end result is a strong, well-capitalized, and tightly controlled
national film economy. But, of course, the buoyancy of that national
economy depends on a competition with Hollywood in the
international arena… and collusion in the domestic market to
exploit the box office potential of American films. Either way,
British companies were forced to operate more or less on
Hollywood’s terms –and those terms rarely extended to offering full
American distribution for British films (ibid.).
The third strategy based on product differentiation is the more self-
conscious patriotic, according to Higson. This attempt to focus on
indigenous cultural traditions and identities implies the problem of
the smallness of domestic markets and, as a consequence, the
correlative budgetary limitations. For this reason, film companies
working on this front have specialized in catering for niche
audiences. Fortunately enough, as Higson concludes, such areas are
generally considered of marginal interest (profitability) by the US
majors (ibid.: 241).
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In addition, and very related to the second strategic response
–competition on the international arena– Higson adds a fourth
economic policy based on international cooperation, established to
emulate those Hollywood studios’ economies of scale. As
mentioned in the historical chapter, a first pan-European attempt
created to mirror Hollywood’s film production and distribution
machinery was the “Film Europe” movement in the 1920s. More
recently, there were the efforts to develop a common efficient
audiovisual policy for the European Union. Effectively, as Higson
remarks, co-productions between companies from different nation-
states imply enormous advantages, like the possibility of high-
budget filmmaking and the extension of the potential audience.
Nevertheless, he adds, “language barriers between different
European countries have hampered this sort of pan-national
cooperation” (ibid.).
These four strategies outlined by Higson, particularly referred to the
case of the British film industry, can be applied, in some way or
another, to most of the Western European countries –leaving apart the
question of common or different language. Effectively, as will be
further developed in the following chapter, national film industries in
Europe are searching for the right balance “to ensure reasonable levels
of profitability”, on the one hand, and “to resist relinquishing the
domestic market altogether with American interests” on the other
(ibid.).
On his part, Mike Wayne, in his book The Politics of Contemporary
European Cinema: Histories, Borders, Diasporas (2002) offers a
different set of terms to explain the “unavoidable, unequal but,
nonetheless, often productive cultural dialogue” between Europe and
Hollywood (Wayne, 2002: 73). As he further explains,
Hollywood cinema has become the dominant paradigm by which films
engage with popular culture. Thus when a European film articulates
some relationship to popular culture, it at one and the same time strikes
up a dialogue with Hollywood (ibid.).
Under this framework, this author develops three types of possible
engagement: a) emulation or following a successful pattern; b)
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translation or migration of talent and creativity; c) and rejection or
defense against cultural dominance (ibid.).
According to Wayne, the first one takes place “where European cinema
adopts the cultural model of the Hollywood film, its narrative
strategies, its generic markers, its use of stars, and so on” (ibid.), and
he mentions the case of The Name of The Rose (J. J. Annaud, 1986),
the adaptation of the Umberto Eco’s novel, set up as a French-Italian-
German co-production, starring Sean Connery and Christian Slater,
directed by a French talent and shot in the English language.
The second mode –translation– “also seeks some engagement with
popular culture as defined by Hollywood”, but at the same time
“emulation gives way to a reworking of such cultural materials,
making them ‘other’ to what they once were and thus claiming them as
in some way distinctly European” (ibid.: 73-74). To illustrate this
trend, Wayne mentions the pioneer example of the French New Wave
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and the work of some German
filmmakers from the 1970s, like Rainer Werner Fassbinder or Wim
Wenders.
Finally, in relation to rejection, this occurs when “European cinema
adopts a mode of film practice that rejects dialogue with Hollywood”
and favors instead “filmic models, which appear to be embedded in
European culture and untouched by American cultural influence”
(ibid.: 74). As examples, Wayne refers the cases of Krzystof
Kieslowski and Lars Von Trier. 
Wayne’s contributions clearly arise from a cultural rather than
economic approach. Nevertheless, as we will see in the following
pages, this unequal but at the same time productive cultural dialogue
between Hollywood and the European cinema takes the form of
precise business strategies.
Finally, in a less systematic but nonetheless inspiring way, Thomas
Elsaesser largely addresses the regular interaction between Hollywood
and Europe in his collection of essays European Cinema: Face to Face
With Hollywood (2005). This book is a good example of how deep and
complex the exchange between Europe and Hollywood is, and offers
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an integrated view of the creative, social, cultural, geographic and
economic dimensions. To begin with, he is very much against the
‘Europe versus Hollywood’ dualism, stating that “what unites Europe
and America is more than what divides them, not least of all because
each needs the other: the insistence on the division often strengthens
the underlying dynamism of the system of alliances” (Elsaesser, 2005:
28). And developing this idea further, he adds:
…[T]he re-appraisal of national cinema and the emergence of a
European cinematic space turns its attention to the Europe-Hollywood-
Europe divide, emphasizing the extent to which this usually binary
relation of buried antagonism and resentment actually functions not
only as a two-way traffic, but acts as an asymmetrical dynamic of
exchange, whose purpose it is to stabilize the system by making both
sides benefit from each other, paradoxically by making-believe that
their regular and ritual stands-offs are base on incompatible
antagonisms (ibid.).
Elsaesser’s book is full of insights and thought-provoking reflections
about this “two-way traffic [and] asymmetrical dynamic of exchange”
between Europe and Hollywood. For the purpose of this research, I
would like to point out just few of them. First of all, with an insistence
on the convenience of avoiding dualistic approaches, this author
defends the inadequacy of considering the European cinema as auteur-
driven (versus the audience-driven Hollywood-style), nationally
limited (versus the international appeal of American movies) and
hostile to Hollywood by definition (ibid.: 485-494). As he concludes,
The dualistic schemes outlined above for the relation Europe-
Hollywood can have no object validity or disinterested status: they are
heavily Euro centered and self-interested... Were one to take the
inverse view, and look at Europe from Hollywood’s perspective, …the
impression would be that the vast majority of cinema audiences in
Europe are happy with Hollywood, and that far from shifting diversity,
the success of Hollywood films has created niched markets and
opportunities for European filmmakers on all levels (ibid.: 494).
Hollywood’s dominance of worldwide film markets is beyond
argument. Nevertheless, as Elsaesser points out, Hollywood’s huge
budgets have made it so dependent on foreign box offices that, to some
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extent, it can be argued that “Hollywood has itself been ‘colonized’ by
its ‘European’ or ‘national’ audiences” (ibid.: 40).
On the collaborative level, the sequence ‘Europe-Hollywood-Europe’
proves that European cinema –and filmmakers– benefits from its
interaction with Hollywood. Thus, using the example of some
contemporary German film directors, Elsaesser explains:
Until an American major had put money into distributing a Wenders or
a Herzog film world-wide, their films could not be seen by German
audiences. In a sense, they had to become Hollywood (or at least
Miramax or Buena Vista), before they could return home to Europe as
representatives of their national cinema (ibid.: 39).
In addition, Elsaesser remarks on the creative exchange, not only in
the case of talent (directors and stars), but also on remakes. “The
highest compliment Hollywood can pay a film from Europe is to re-
make it”, he assesses (ibid.: 493). Examples he mentions are Wim
Wenders’ Wings of Desire as City of Angels, Alejandro Amenábar’s
Abre los ojos as Vanilla Sky or George Sluizer’s Spoorloos as The
Vanishing.
On the competitive front, Elsaesser defends the necessity of producing
European films able to compete with Hollywood movies on the
international arena using the co-production formula. “Co-productions
have become the norm, rather than the exception”, he explains, “and
contemporary auteurs feel neither called upon to be ‘artists’ nor to play
the role of nationally representative figures”. And he adds: “what
matters is how well local/national provenance can communicate with
global/transnational audiences” (ibid.: 491). In this sense, he also
points out the need for a more popular storytelling, like the ones of
Tom Tykwer (Run Lola Run), Roberto Benigni (Life is Beautiful) or
Jean-Pierre Jeunet (Amelie). These filmmakers “have made powerful
and striking films… without being less European or less concerned
with important issues” (ibid.: 487).
In my view, Elsaesser’s contributions are very much at the core of the
issues discussed here, and throw some new lights that help to
understand the complexity of the Europe-Hollywood relationship.
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4.2. Geographical and Organizational Approach
Another interesting perspective for studying the connections between
the American and the European film industries is the geographical and
organizational approach. Under this focus, I am namely referring to the
geography of economic activity –how the structure and dynamics of
modern production systems have contributed to the emergence of
massive agglomeration of capital and labor, creating different clusters
of activity around urban centers, and the effects of globalization. In
this sense, the film industry –and particularly Hollywood– as a
cultural-product manufacturer, has caught the attention of many
experts from this field in recent times, either from a comprehensive
perspective (Scott, 2005; Newman, 2008) or from specific points of
view, like the decentralization of film production (Goldsmith &
O’Reagan, 2005a; Elmer & Gasher, 2005), the new dynamics of
cultural labor (Miller et al., 2001; 2005), or the creative talent
exchange (Morrison, 1998; Behlil, 2007). I will briefly comment on
some of the most significant contributions for the purpose of this
research.
Allen J. Scott is probably one of the most recognized experts on this
topic. His book On Hollywood: The Place, The Industry (2005) has
become an obliged reference when studying the geography of
economic activity, especially in the case of cultural-products industries
(motion pictures, television, music, etc.). As he assesses from the very
beginning, Hollywood has become “one of the most highly developed
agglomerations of productive activity anywhere, and a major urban
phenomenon in its own right” (Scott, 2005: xi). Nevertheless, he goes
on to argue that, “despite the huge amounts of literature that have been
written about Hollywood… its development and functions as an
operating industrial system, tightly bound up in both local and global
relations of reciprocity and competition, are comparatively little
understood” (ibid.). And he continues:
As current processes of globalization run their course, the cultural and
economic power of Hollywood is evoking a growing number of
complex political responses in different parts of the world. At the same
time, perhaps ironically, globalization is making it possible to raise a
question… namely, is it plausible to think that other centers of
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cinematographic production in other parts of the world might rise to
challenge Hollywood’s hegemony? (ibid.: xii)
As a response, Scott argues in favor of a “new geography of cultural
production”, aimed at a new audiovisual landscape, “more polycentric and
more polyglot” (ibid.: 167-175), based on the emergence of three factors:
One… is the resurgence of motion picture production complexes in
several different countries in Europe and Asia… Another is the
increasing visibility and international competitiveness of non-
American firms with interests in media and entertainment. Yet another
is the great expansion of niche markets for cultural products in all of
the main capitalists countries, and, more specifically, the recent growth
in these countries of audiences for films and television programs made
in places other than Hollywood (ibid.: 168).
These “local and global relations of reciprocity and competition”
propelled by the “current processes of globalization” are precisely
what this research is all about, as we will see in the next chapters. In
this scenario, Scotts also mentions the need to promote “distinctive
differences” between Hollywood and non-Hollywood film industries
on the one hand, and the need of common production strategies –like
“films with high production values that appeal to global audiences”–
on the other (ibid.: 170-71).
On his part, David Newman (2008), studying in particular the
connections between Hollywood and Australia-New Zealand, offers a
center-periphery model as a theoretical framework to analyze the
relationships between Hollywood and non-Hollywood industries. As
this author recalls, in the early days, Hollywood was a geographical
place denoting not only a center of filmmaking activity, but also a style
of production. Nowadays, he adds, 
Hollywood continues to be centered in a geographical location, but the
label carries more weight as a mode or form of production, as
production locations increasingly are situated at a considerable
distance from the geographic centre of Hollywood and the US
(Newman, 2008: 298).
According to this author, this interaction occurs on a number of levels,
“with the local industries gaining in recognition and power as an
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increasing number of variables flow between the Hollywood center
and the periphery” (ibid.: 296). 
Figure 11. 
Center-Periphery Model for Hollywood/non-Hollywood Industries
Source: Newman, D. (2008). “Australia and New Zealand: Expats in Hollywood and
Hollywood South”. In P. McDonald & J. Wasko (Eds.), The Contemporary Hollywood
Film Industry. Malden (MA): Blackwell Publishing (p. 297).
As Newman explains, this process begins with the continuous flow of
movies from Hollywood towards local cinemas all over the world.
The success of these films in the periphery creates a multi-fold effect.
First of all, a talent migration to Hollywood (stars, writers,
directors), moving from the periphery to the epicenter of the industry
in search of career advancement. The same applies for crew and
technicians. As this author points out, “in each of these categories,
there may be a flow back into the domestic industry from
Hollywood”, although it is also possible to find “Hollywood people
moving out to smaller industries, drawn by the opportunities they
represent” (ibid.). Secondly, he refers to the runaway productions, or
those “Hollywood productions [based] themselves in a local
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industry/location”, although “this is more likely to happen if there is
an existing infrastructure in place with trained (and experienced)
crews”, Newman explains. And he remarks, “[a]s the local industry
develops and becomes more skilled and experienced, it may become
possible for it to attract internationally mobile productions looking
for unique scenery and cost savings” (ibid.: 297).
As this author keeps on saying, this filmmaking activity outside the US
“may lead to closer relationships between Hollywood and the local
industry”, more particularly through an exchange of financial and
intellectual capital –“with financial capital flowing into the local
industry from Hollywood, and ideas or intellectual capital flowing
back into Hollywood” (ibid.). In addition, distribution exchanges may
also occur, as “films themselves from the local industry may flow back
into the Hollywood market” (ibid). A final component of the model in
relation to the non-Hollywood national industries, according to
Newman, is local government’s policies, “who may intervene to
restrict or enhance the flows between Hollywood and the local non-
Hollywood domestic industry” (ibid.).
As a last remark, Newman assesses that 
Although the model used here is a two-level center-periphery model, it
is evident that there is a semi-periphery in operation… in some areas
of the world, or alternative centers where a local cinema has regional
prominence or dominance (such as China, South Korea and India)
(ibid.).
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, many of the aspects
described by Scott and Newman have been largely studied by others
authors. This is the case of Morrison (1998) and Behlil (2007) in
respect to talent migration; Goldsmith & O’Reagan (2005) and
Elmer & Gasher (2005) in relation with the productions studios
worldwide and runaway productions; and Miller et al. (2001; 2005)
with regard to the exchange of financial, intellectual and labor
capital. It would be beyond this research scope to further expand on
all these scholars. In the next chapters, I will return to some of them
for specific references.
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4.3. Business Management Approach
As is easily understood, all the previous contributions refer, in one way
or another, to the opposite though intertwined dynamics of cooperation
and competition, as they are usually described from the business
management perspective. In this regard, I consider it quite adequate to
summarize the current status of the Europe-Hollywood relations, as well
as offering an integrated view of the different visions described before.
It is probably not a mere coincidence that Ray Noorda, founder of the
networking software company, Novell, coined the word of
“coopetition” in 1993. At least in the communications world, the 1990s
are historically considered the decade of the digital and global
revolution (Hoskins, McFadyen, & Finn, 1997; Litman, 1998; Balio,
1998; Vogel, 1998). As reviewed at the end of the first chapter, that
decade witnessed an unprecedented tendency towards concentration
and diversification of communication and entertainment companies
through mergers and buy-outs, giving birth to the current large
conglomerates and multinational corporations. In some way, this
natural growth and adaptation process mirrored those from other
business and industrial sectors.
For the purpose of this research, I am also relying on the contributions
of three authors from the business management field: on the one hand,
Adam Brandenburger and Barry Nalebuff (1996), and on the other,
Yadong Luo (2004). Paraphrasing Noorda, the former explained that, in
the current scenario of world businesses, companies “have to compete
and cooperate at the same time... The combination makes a more
dynamic relationship than the words ‘competition’ and ‘cooperation’
suggest individually” (Brandenbruger & Nalebuff, 1996: 4-5).
Applied to the business world, rival companies act as “complementors
in making markets and competitors in dividing up markets” (ibid.:
34). Under this basic premise, adopted from the game theory, both
authors develop a paradigm called “The Net Value”, where a given
company or product is presented as the crossing point of two axles,
the vertical one being determined by the consumer-supplier
relationship and the horizontal one by the competitors-complementors
tenseness (ibid.: 17).
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On his part, Yadong Luo (2004) offers a very complete and practical
analysis of coopetition strategies in the context of multinational
enterprises working on a worldwide scale. According to this author,
Coopetition is a new philosophy, strategy or approach that goes
beyond the conventional rules of competition and cooperation to
combine the advantages of both (ibid.: 11).
Coopetition means cooperating to create a bigger business pie while
competing to divide it up. In doing so, however, each global player has
a unique position in the game of coopetition, requiring peculiar tactics
to respond to forces of cooperation and competition so as to secure
maximum returns from the game… Coopetition is attributed to
increasing interdependence between global players and heightened
needs for collective actions, risk sharing, strategic flexibility, and
prompt response to market demands (ibid.: 201-202).
Within this framework, this author speaks of four different types of
coopetitive relationships: a) with global rivals, b) with foreign
governments, c) with alliance partners and d) within a multinational
enterprise. 
The coopetition with global rivals occurs when they work together to
“collectively enhance performance by sharing resources and
committing to common tasks goals in some domains (e.g. product-
market or value-chain activity)”. At the same time, “they compete by
taking independent action in other domains to improve their own
performances” (ibid.: 11). In the case of foreign governments,
coopetition exists “both domestically and internationally, because
governments create the rules by which business must abide and
business creates the capital to fund a stronger nation” (ibid.: 57). A
friendly host government can offer “better investment infrastructure,
easier market access, more financial privileges and greater institutional
support”. On its part, cooperative multinational companies can act as
“important assets to host governments, positively affecting indigenous
economies… through employment and training, technology transfer
and product innovation” as well as contributing to “foreign exchange
earnings and taxation incomes” (ibid.: 58). Regarding the coopetition
with global alliance partners, it occurs in “those cross-border joint
ventures or contractual alliances operating in a highly uncertain
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environment”. In this case, competition “is manifested in control –each
party competes for the power or authority to be used for controlling
joint decisions or alliance operations…” On the other hand, cooperation
means “mutual forbearance and commitment in the allocation and
exploitation of resources” from which all the parties benefit (ibid.: 102).
Finally, in relation with the coopetition within a multinational
enterprise, working on a global scale demands “geographically
dispersed yet internally differentiated foreign subunits, whether they be
joint ventures, cooperative alliances, wholly-owned subsidiaries,
branch offices, or other forms”. As a consequence, “a transnational
solution that combines both global integration and national
responsiveness is essential to maximizing consolidated economic
returns contributed by globally scattered subunits” (ibid.: 161).
Although neither Hollywood nor the European film industries can be
considered a single multinational enterprise, this brief summary of Luo’s
contributions will help us to understand how their relationship mirrors the
model of coopetition on several levels, at least in an analogical way.
4.4. Hollywood and Europe as Global Rivals
Effectively, it could be possible to analyze the strategies developed by
Hollywood and Europe as global rivals, as they have been for more than
a century, trying to conquer the international film market. The same
could be asserted in relation with foreign governments, since Hollywood
has needed to develop diplomatic strategies to overcome national
barriers raised up by European countries. In addition, as the business and
the industrial processes are being globalized and decentralized,
coopetition with international alliance partners (e.g. US-European co-
productions and distribution agreements) as well as within multinational
enterprises (Hollywood majors’ subsidiaries in Europe) is necessary.
Having said that, and advancing one of the hypothesis to be discussed,
I am also proposing that the consideration of Hollywood and Europe
as global rivals is an especially apt one. Effectively, the history of the
relationships between both film industries is one of extreme rivalry
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and, from time to time, some collaboration (Guback, 1969; Thomsom,
1985; De Grazia, 1989; Jarvie, 1992; Ellwood & Kroes, 1994;
Segrave, 1997; Higson & Maltby, 1999b; Trumpbour, 2002). As
Brandenburger & Nalebuff say, “[b]usiness is War and Peace. But it is
not… endless cycles of war followed by peace followed by war. It’s
simultaneously war and peace” (Brandenbruger & Nalebuff, 1996: 4-
5). The metaphor of alternate periods of confrontation and calm
perfectly applies to the Europe-Hollywood relationship according to
its historical evolution. Effectively, terms like “cultural invasion”
(Jarvie, 1998: 42) or “cultural imperialism” (Miller et al., 2005: 64)
have been spread over the years among those opposed to the American
hegemony. Moreover, these conflictive relations have also been
defined as an “undeclared war” (Puttnam & Watson, 1997), where the
powerful Hollywood army tries to assault ‘Fortress Europe’ and get a
bigger percentage of the European film market share.
Describing the coopetition between global rivals, Luo points out the
following properties: 1) it implies coexistence of cooperation and
competition between the same global rivals; 2) it differs from the mere
cooperative alliance between global rivals; 3) rivals associated with
coopetition can be either foreign or local, but they must compete in
global markets; 4) it is characterized by the simultaneity and dualism
of cooperation and competition; in other words, these opposed
strategies take place at the same time; and 5) it may occur at corporate,
division or subsidiary levels, depending on strategic intents and
organizational needs (Luo, 2004: 13-16). Keeping these characteristics
in mind, we will be able to conclude at the end if they are applicable
to the Europe-Hollywood case or not1.
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1 In his book, Luo offers a detailed analysis of coopetition between multinational
companies acting as global rivals. He not only mentions those reasons and factors
that generally foster coopetition, but also details the conditions when cooperation
and competition increase. In addition, he develops two possible scenarios of this
sort of coopetition, the first one applicable to the case of intesity of coopetition with
a major global rival and the second one illustrating the diversity of coopetition with
multiple global rivals. In each one of them, he describes a typology of companies
depending on their specific role or tactic. This further analysis, though interesting,
is not very applicable to our topic, at least in this first approach.
4.5. Hypotheses and Methodology 
With the previous theoretical framework in mind, the three main
hypotheses this research will try to demonstrate are:
1) The current Europe-Hollywood relationship could be defined as a
form of coopetition, at least in an analogical way. This coopetition
takes place through a wide range of simultaneous cooperative and
competitive strategies.
2) Among the different types of coopetition described by Luo, the
coopetition between global rivals matches better with the current
status of the Europe-Hollywood dynamics, although it maintains
some peculiarities that convert it into a very special case.
3) At the same time, under the geographical-organizational point of
view, this coopetition between Hollywood and the European film
industry fits into the center-periphery model proposed by Newman,
although in a more sophisticated way.
In order to accomplish this task, I am relying on a two-step
methodology. Firstly, using the contributions from the cinema studies
authors (Higson, Wayne and Elsaesser) and the geographical-
organizational approaches (Scott and Newman) as a basis, and
adapting them to the business management perspective (Luo), I have
identified some of the main cooperative and competitive strategies
currently present in the Europe-Hollywood exchange. They are
summarized in table 6.
Of course, although I will focus on them separately, some of these
strategies take place in an intertwined way. For instance, many of the
distribution agreements imply also a sort of co-production formula. In
a similar way, many big European production movies could be used at
the same time as examples of European blockbusters and of European
English-language films. Or when talking about the production of local
movies as a competitive strategy, we should not forget that a few of
them are being produced by the Hollywood majors too.
Secondly, in relation to the bibliography, I have looked for recent
examples of these trends (2000 onwards) using well-known trade
papers like Screen International and Variety –in their online version–
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as a main source of information, together with many other news items,
some reports and other references.
Table 6. 
The Europe-Hollywood Coopetition
Source: Own elaboration.
The next two chapters describe the cooperative and competitive
strategies summarized in this table in some detail and provide
examples from several European territories. It must be noted that these
coopetitive trends are still under a process of consolidation
–illustrative cases appear in trade papers on a daily basis– so the
following must be considered a first approach to the issue.
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Strategies of 
COOPERATION
• Distribution Partnerships
• Financial Co-Productions
• Exchange of Talent and Creativity (Remakes)
• Runaway Productions and Foreign Service Production
Strategies of 
COMPETITION
• European ‘Blockbusters’
• European English-Language Films
• Emulating Hollywood: Sequels, Franchising, Comic
Adaptations and Company Branding
• Pan-European Public and Private Financial Initiatives
• Pan-European Distribution Attempts
• Promoting National / Local Cinema
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5. Strategies of Cooperation
Hollywood majors are facing the reality of the limited although still
dominant appeal of their movies and the growing popularity of local
films around the world. Nevertheless, rather than trying to fight against
competition, the studios are joining it, eager to engage in partnerships
to produce and distribute local films both to earn back some of its lost
market and to help to ameliorate its “Evil Empire” image by creating
the impression of “giving back” to local industry (Tartaglione-Vialatte,
2001). For this reason, in the last few years the American majors have
created specific divisions (Miramax, Fox Searchlight, Sony Classics,
Warner Independent Movies, Paramount Classics) or developed joint
ventures with local companies to produce and distribute films in
languages other than English. As a consequence, some Hollywood
majors have gone through a process of internationalization of
resources –talent, capital and local infrastructure– as part of this
process of interaction (Wasko, 2003: 182; Klein, 2003).
In the case of Europe, on the one hand Hollywood’s market share has
stagnated recently as European films come more into the mainstream,
giving the majors added incentive to move into the local industry to
obtain new revenues to offset the ever rising costs (Guider, 2004). On
the other, some of these partnerships often provide a lifeline for
struggling independents rocked by the fragmentation of the European
industry and in urgent need of secure channels of financing, content, or
distribution. It must be underlined that cooperation between these two
rival industries reflects mutual economic interests, taking priority over
nationalistic interests –in the case of Europe– and adopting many
forms.
Within this framework, the four main strategies of cooperation
between Europe and Hollywood proposed here are: 1) distribution
partnerships, 2) financial co-productions, 3) exchange of talent and
creativity, and 4) runaway productions.
5.1. Distribution Partnerships
At the distribution level, US majors seek to strengthen their positions
in European distribution markets through mergers and alliances with
local distributors, aimed at maximizing revenues while circumventing
quotas and restrictions. As one observer explains, 
This move derives from studio executives’ suspicion that Hollywood
films may have reached the limits of their overseas appeal…
[Therefore] Hollywood is finding ways to turn into profit on the desire
of local audiences to see local films; rather than trying to bear
competition, the studios are joining it. In the last few years, Columbia,
Warner Brothers, Disney/Buenavista, Miramax and Universal have all
created special divisions or partnerships to produce and distribute films
in language other than English –including German, Spanish, French,
Italian, Brazilian, Korean and Chinese (Klein, 2003).
For example, 20th Century Fox has developed joint venture deals with
Warner and Sony in Europe, together with local partners in France (UGC)
and Spain (Hispano Foxfilm). At the same time, European distribution
groups have formed alliances with the Hollywood majors. Examples of
this are the Gaumont joint venture with Buenavista International (GBVI)
and UGC with Fox (UFD) in France; Mediaset with Castle Rock
Entertainment and BIM with Columbia in Italy; or Lauren Films with
Buena Vista and Sogecine with Warner Bros in Spain (both extinct right
now). As a consequence, these major groups are distributing not only
American blockbusters but also a large yearly percentage of Europe’s
most successful films and some of the more promising European art-
house titles, leaving few business opportunities for the small independent
distributors (Carver, 1997; Jäckel, 2003: 109-110). Nevertheless, this
formula seems to be falling into disfavor, since most of the previous deals
are no longer in place (Lange, Newman-Baudais, & Hugot, 2007: 15).
In addition, independent European distributors frequently seek to enter
into partnership with Hollywood majors to distribute their films in
certain territories. In some cases this results in European companies
buying film rights directly from Hollywood producers (like the Lauren-
Miramax deal in Spain or the Entertainment Film Distributors-New Line
agreement in England), and in other cases it means joining forces with a
ALEJANDRO
PARDO
THE EUROPE-HOLLYWOOD
COOPETITION
66
Is
su
e 
20
07
N
um
be
r 
Ei
gh
t
major’s already extant European distribution arm as mentioned before.
While these expensive partnerships provide valuable content access in an
increasingly competitive distribution market, they can become a double-
edged sword, damning the company to dependence on Hollywood for
success. In this case, when Hollywood producers decide to pull out of
the deal (say, to distribute through their own in-house distributors) the
company can find itself in more trouble than before –as happened, for
example, to Spanish Lauren Films, which found itself bankrupt after
Miramax cut off its deal (Halligan, 2004).
At the same time, Hollywood distributors –to some extent the only true
international distributors in Europe– have begun distributing European
films with greater frequency than ever before. As the potential of the
local film market in Europe has clarified, the majors have begun to move
more aggressively to cherry pick the most promising local titles (Carver,
1997). The studios’ international infrastructure is evolving to
accommodate a trend that has been around for years and is poised to
explode. “The international marketplace is still growing whereas it’s
clearly stabilised in North America”, says Universal Pictures co-
president David Linde (Kay, 2007a). As a matter of fact, this US major
formally announced during the 2007 Cannes Film Festival the launching
of its international production outfit, Universal Pictures International
(UPI), aimed at worldwide acquisitions and local production programs
outside North America and the UK to back a slate of international stories
and local language films. Among other agreements, UPI signed a local
production and distribution deal with Russian director Timur
Bekmambetov and his Bazelevs Productions (Goodridge, 2007b).
As a consequence, a large yearly percentage of Europe’s most
successful films are handled by Hollywood, especially in Spain and the
UK, where they distribute over 50% of the year’s top ten local films.
Films like Love Actually (2003), Johnny English (2003), The Sea
Inside (Mar adentro, 2004), Volver (2006) and The Orphanage (El
orfanato, 2007) reach local and international audiences alike through
Hollywood distributors. England, especially, is an exceptional case.
Hollywood distributors account for over 95% of the market share of
local films, and local distributors for local films garner an incredible
0.4% of the overall British box office (Guider & McNary, 2006: 3).
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Table 7. 
Top 20 European Movie Hits by Distributor (2000-2005)
Notes:
- Admissions (in 000s) in the European Union (25 countries).
- Movies produced in Europe with US inward investment excluded.
- Code: Light grey color represents US major distributors in each country. Dark grey rep-
resents joint-ventures between a US major and a local distributor. Non-colored compa-
nies means independent distributors.
Source: Own elaboration based on Lange’s study (Lange, 2003: 15).
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Title Year Origin Admiss GB FR DE ES IT
1 Bridget 
Jones’ Diary
2001 GB 28,808 UIP Mars UIP UIP UIP
2 Astérix &
Obélix: 
Mission 
Cleopatre
2002 FR 21,525 Pathé UIP Tobls 
Studio
Tripic-
tures
UIP
3 Le fabulous
destin d’Amé-
lie Poulain
2001 FR 19,925 Mo-
men-
tum
UFD Prokino Vértigo BIM 
Distri-
buzione
4 Bridget 
Jones: The Ed-
ge of Reason
2004 GB 19,474 UIP Mars UIP UIP UIP
5 Love 
Actually
2003 GB 15,390 UIP Studio
Canal
UIP UIP UIP
6 Los Otros 2001 ES 14,376 Buena-
vista
Inter.
Bac Senator War-
ner-
Soge-
films
Lucky
Red /
Eyes
Screen
7 Johnny 
English
2003 GB 13,649 UIP Mars UIP UIP UIP
8 Der Schus des 
Manitu
2001 DE 13,905 Cons-
tantin
: : Uni-
versal
(DVD)
:
9 Billy Elliot 2000 GB 12,380 UIP UIP Mars UIP UIP
10 Taxi 2 2000 FR 12,185 Tobls 
Studio Tripic-
tures
ARP 
Seléc-
tion
Metro-
dome
Cecchi
Gori
11 Les Choristes 2004 FR 11,650 Alta 
Classics
Pathé Pathé Cons-
tantin
:
12 Les Bronzés
3: amis pour
la vie
2006 FR 10,780 : War-
ner
Bros
: : :
13 About a Boy 2002 GB 10,181 UIP Mars UIP UIP UIP
14 Goodbye, 
Lenin!
2003 DE 10,530 Wanda Océan
Films
UGC X Ver-
leih AG
Lady
Film
15 (T)Raumschiff 
Surprise -1
2004 DE 10,371 Cons-
tantin
: : : :
In this sense, table 7 shows how a significant percentage of the recent
European ‘blockbusters’ –especially among the top 10– have been
distributed either by one of the Hollywood majors’ subsidiaries or by
a national distributor with a distribution agreement with a US
company (as in the cases of GBVI, UFD or Warner-Sogefilms,
mentioned before). It should be mentioned that this table does not
include successful franchises as James Bond, Harry Potter nor
Aardman Animation’s last movies. Neither does it include other
European films with US inward investment (like Kingdom of Heaven
or Sahara).
These US-European distribution deals also cover the home
entertainment market. In France, for instance, the recently formed
Universal Pictures International Entertainment and Studio Canal have
created a joint venture to handle home entertainment titles in France.
The new entity is named Universal Studio Canal Video GIE and has
become the market leader in the French home entertainment market.
Similarly, Paramount Home Entertainment France and Gaumont Video
has signed an agreement which allows the former release the French
major’s films in the French DVD sector (Mitchell, 2007b; Tartaglione-
Vialatte, 2007).
In addition, many production companies –even large media
enterprises– partner with Hollywood distributors in the form of output
deals. As budgets and risk rise, European production companies
frequently seek out Hollywood distributors to handle their films
(Foreman, 2001b). Their size, breadth and marketing expertise give
them enormous leverage with producers, and their ability to secure
distribution internationally –even in the coveted American market–
provide Hollywood distributors with strong advantages when it comes
to attracting content (Minns, 1997). Nevertheless, this is not only a
question of European companies taking advantage of Hollywood
‘know-how’, but also the US distributors getting local financial
support for marketing costs. This is the case of Medienstream, a
German fund which has invested more than € 740 million in financing
20th Century Fox’s marketing campaigns, including big hits like The
Fast and the Furious (2001), The League of Extraordinary Gentlemen
(2003) or I, Robot (2004) (Blaney, 2003a).
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5.2. Financial Co-Productions
Within this category it should be mentioned not only the American
majors co-financing European movies through specific divisions
(Miramax, Fox Searchlight, Sony Classics, Warner Independent
Movies, Paramount Classics) as mentioned before, but also
European companies –mainly French and German– investing in
Hollywood films. In these agreements, partners seek to gain a
measure of control over content and secure rights packages
(Dawtrey & Foreman, 1999; Foreman, 1999, 2001a; Buquet, 2005:
166-170). Nevertheless, for some critics, the risk for a European
company is inevitably finding itself as the minor partner, spending
money but getting little real power in return (Foreman, 2001b). It
can be argued as Elsaesser suggests, that through this strategy
Hollywood is, “in a sense masquerading as ‘national cinema’”.
Nevertheless, the counter effect is, that also “national cinemas are
now acting as ‘world cinema’” (Elsaesser, 2005: 502).
In one direction, Hollywood is increasingly investing in European
film productions. To accomplish this goal more easily, US majors
have created international production divisions or partnered with
existing companies in some of the main Western European countries,
using local talent to produce slates of local movies (Wasko, 2003:
182; Macnab, Mitchell, & Gubbins, 2007). These films can then be
distributed (by their distribution companies) throughout the country
and, if successful, they have a better chance to take off
internationally. Films like France’s A Very Long Engagement (Un
long dimanche de fiançailles, 2004), Italy’s What Fault Is This of
Ours? (Ma che colpa abiamo noi, 2003), both financed by Warner
Brothers, or Spain’s Di que sí (2004), by Columbia, can often easily
recoup their small budgets through the local box office. They provide
the majors with a low-cost source of revenue in a sector of the market
they could not otherwise access, and they provide European
filmmakers with the opportunity to work with bigger budgets and
more marketing power than they would get independently. On the
other hand they take profits out of European hands and help
Hollywood establish little vertically-integrated mini-studios within
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each country. In fact, there is increasing competition from the studios
and the bigger US independents, which have acquired a voracious
appetite for local content, once reserved for the independent sector
(Macnab, Mitchell, & Gubbins, 2007).
In each case, a major studio has played an integral part in the
production process. Warner Brothers’ vast experience with local-
language co-productions, for instance, helped Spain’s The
Orphanage (El orfanato, 2007) become the biggest Spanish-
language release in the territory. José Antonio Bayona’s supernatural
drama cost approximately US$ 4 million to make and has grossed
more than US$ 33 million so far, which demonstrates the potential
profitability of local-language partnerships. “We look at each country
on its own merits and do whatever is good for that country”, says
Richard Fox, Warner Brothers Entertainment’s executive vice-
president of international. “If we have a film like The Orphanage or
A Very Long Engagement that will travel, we go for it” (Kay, 2007a).
In this sense, Warner Brothers is moving into co-production in
Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Netherlands –apart from
Brazil, Mexico, Japan, India and China.
Similarly, following the success of releases such as the Spanish-
language Alatriste in 2006, Fox International has spent much of this
year consolidating and developing its production partnerships. “With
the continued growth in market share of local films and the
improvement in the quality of local production, it’s clear the
production of local-language films will be an important business for
us”, say co-presidents Tomas Jegeus and Paul Hanneman (ibid.). Fox’s
releases for 2008 include Krabat in Germany.
On its part, Sony Pictures Entertainment’s (SPE) International Motion
Picture Production Department is developing an extensive network of
global ties, including upcoming ventures in Germany and Russia. The
company is planning to make films with Matthew Vaughn and Kris
Thykier’s Marv Films in the UK, and is also preparing comeback to the
production of German-language feature films after acquiring the film
rights to Tommy Jaud’s best-selling second novel Resturlaub, to be
released in 2009. In Russia, SPE has a one-year-old joint venture
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company, Monumental Pictures, in which it is teamed with German-
born distributor Michael Schlicht and exhibitor Paul Heth, whose
Soquel Ventures is a partner with National Amusements in fast-
growing multiplex circuit Rising Star Media. Monumental has already
completed two films, Yevgeny Bedarev’s Awaiting A Miracle and Igor
Shavlak’s horror thriller Trackman, released in 2007. “Whether we
partner with people on the ground or do it on our own, we believe in
each territory and never want to homogenize product”, says president
Deborah Schindler. “The mandate is to make local product with local
people and talent in each territory” (Kay, 2007a; Blaney, 2007h;
Goodridge, 2007a).
In the reverse direction, European monies feeding Hollywood
production coffers have run for years. It would be enough to think
of Crèdit Lyonnais, Le Studio Canal Plus and Vivendi in the past,
together with the international joint venture Mutual Film Company
and the German Neuer Market. The lively Canal Plus for instance
entered into agreements with Mandalay, Warner’s Bel Air and
Spyglass Entertainment, among others (Miller et al., 2005: 184-
204). Whereas some of these initiatives were mostly successful
(Crèdit Lyonnais and Le Studio Canal Plus), others ended up as
unexpected failures. Vivendi-Universal had trouble uniting both
ends of its media empire and had trouble turning competition
between European and Hollywood companies into cooperation as
Universal’s UIP distributor clashed with Studio Canal’s own in-
house European system (Frater & Brown, 2000). Consequently, not
only did the merger provide little tangible benefit for the European
film industry, but it also ravaged Canal Plus and reinforced Europe’s
inferiority complex with regards to Hollywood (James, 2003). In a
similar way, the now defunct German-Italian Epsilon entered into a
co-finance deal with Spyglass Entertainment, agreeing to invest
millions of dollars in their productions in return for territory rights
in Europe. However, the results of this strategy have been uneven at
best (Blaney, 1997, 2003a).
More recently the Hollywood studios have been relying on what is
called equity markets for financing slates of films, like some German
tax funds and investment capital firms and the UK sale and leaseback
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schemes. According to some analysts, these initiatives provided the
core finance of many Hollywood blockbusters –as much as 20%-30%
of their gigantic budgets. It must be remarked that some of these
British and German financial schemes are no longer in place.
Governments in Europe are increasingly against funding mechanisms
through which global investors shelter their tax liabilities at the
expense of the public (Gubbins, 2007b, 2007d).
In the case of Germany, some local companies have acted as
intermediaries between American studios and German cinemas and
television. Furthermore, some risk-capital funds have acted as
limited liability companies (or GmbH in German) for Hollywood
studios, under the umbrella of German tax incentive schemes
(Krämer, 2008: 243-245). Examples of these are Hannover Leasing,
linked to Universal, and Alcas/KG, tied to Paramount. In the same
way, the German bank Dresdner Kleinwort created in 2006 a fund of
US$ 300 million called Melrose 2 as a part of its film finance
arrangement with Paramount. A similar case is the renewed theatrical
slate financing agreement between Fox Filmed Entertainment and
Dune Entertainment, recently extended, by which the latter has
committed to invest more than US$ 500m in Fox films over the next
three years. Significantly enough, Dresdner Kleinwort (German) and
Societé Générale Corporate (French) acted as joint mandated lead
arrangers and financing facility for Dune Entertainment. Also in
regard to France, US home entertainment distributor Genius Products
has signed a three-year revolving credit facility arranged by Societé
Générale for an initial commitment of US$ 30 million rising to a total
of US$ 70 million based on expected incremental commitments. The
debt will be used to provide working capital and to finance
acquisitions, production and co-productions, distribution and
marketing. Finally, in the case of the UK, the Royal Bank of Scotland
recently signed a two-year co-financing package contract with New
Line Cinema (linked to Warner Brothers) worth US$ 350 million for
the production of 20 films (Bensi, 2004; Brass, 2007a; Gubbins,
2007b; Kay, 2007c, 2007d). 
For this reason, as figure 11 illustrates, the number of the US-
Europe co-productions has increased dramatically, thanks mainly to
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the favorable British and German investment policies mentioned
above, although there was also a significant decrease in 2004, when
some of these initiatives disappeared or were transformed. It is not
a coincidence that many of these Euro-American co-productions are
among the most successful films in Europe as well as in the US and,
in fact, they are hardly identified as European movies, as table 8
shows. For example, apart from franchises like James Bond, Harry
Potter or Star Wars, recent US-British co-productions include Black
Hawk Dawn (2001), Troy (2004) and Batman Begins (2005). Other
movies like We Were Soldiers (2002), American Wedding (2003) or
Fantastic Four (2005) are US-German co-productions, the same as
the Bourne series. And, to mention some extreme examples, hits
like Lara Croft: Tomb Raider (2001) or Terminator 3 (2003) were
co-produced between US, UK and Germany, the same as Kingdom
of Heaven (2005) with the addition of Spain as the main co-
producing country. Also, Alexander (2004) was designed as a co-
production among US, Netherlands, UK and France, with German
funding too.
Figure 12. 
US-EU Co-productions (1997-2005)
Source: Own elaboration on EAO.
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Table 8. 
Top 20 US-EU Co-Productions by Admissions in EU (2000-2005)
Source: Own elaboration on EAO.
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No. Title Year Nationality EU (25) % USA % USA+EU
1 Bridget Jo-
nes’s Diary
2001 GB / US 28,808,910 68.5% 13,273,363 31.5% 42,082,273
2 Troy 2004 US / GB / MT 24,769,976 53.6% 21,458,776 46.4% 46,228,752
3 Bridget 
Jones: The
Edge of 
Reason
2004 GB / US / FR
/DE / IE
19,474,790 75.2% 6,421,578 24.8% 25,896,368
4 Charlie and
The Choco-
late Factory
2005 GB / US 19,823,399 38.1% 32,208,904 61.9% 52,032,303
5 Terminator 3 2003 US / DE / GB 16,873,349 40.4% 24,935,040 59.6% 41,808,389
6 Love 
Actually
2003 US / GB 15,390,449 61.0% 9,840,135 39.0% 25,230,584
7 Chicken
Run
2000 GB US 15,375,110 44.2% 19,424,466 55.8% 34,799,576
8 Lara Croft:
Tom 
Raider
2001 US / GB / JP /
DE
13,652,719 35.9% 24,335,448 64.1% 37,988,167
9 Johnny 
English
2003 US / GB 13,649,945 74.6% 4,641,560 25.4% 18,291,505
10 American 
Wedding
2003 US / DE 13,471,830 43.8% 17,312,158 56.2% 30,783,988
11 Wallace &
Gromit:
The Curse
of the We-
re-Rabbit
2005 GB / US 13,250,226 60.2% 8,747,043 39.8% 21,997,269
12 Van 
Helsing
2004 US / CZ 12,509,070 39.3% 19,335,426 60.7% 31,844,496
13 Kingdom of 
Heaven
2005 GB / DE / ES
/ US
10,943,272 59.7% 7,394,448 40.3% 18,337,720
14 Fantastic
Four
2005 US / DE 10,920,772 31.2% 24,133,553 68.8% 35,054,325
15 Red Dragon 2002 US / DE / GB 10,841,455 40.4% 16,026,796 59.6% 26,868,251
16 Sahara 2004 US / GB / ES 10,793,188 50.2% 10,713,248 49.8% 21,506,436
17 King Arthur 2004 GB / US 10,333,355 55.3% 8,354,589 44.7% 18,687,944
18 About  A
Boy
2002 GB / US / FR
/ DE
10,181,709 59.2% 7,014,351 40.8% 17,196,060
19 Gangs of
New York
2002 US / DE / IT /
GB
9,516,815 45.0% 11,615,657 55.0% 21,132,472
20 Alexander 2004 GB / FR / NL
/ US
8,832,469 61.7% 5,475,040 38.3% 14,307,509
If we think in box-office terms, these US-European co-productions
accounted for 41.7% on average out of the top 10 European films
(from the admissions point of view) for the period 2000-05, and 14.7%
out of the top 50 (see figure 13).
Figure 13. 
Breakdown of Top European Films by Admissions (Average 2000-05)
Source: Own elaboration on EAO.
It must be noted that some of these British and German financial
schemes are no longer in place. Governments in Europe are
increasingly against funding mechanisms through which global
investors shelter their tax liabilities at the expense of the public, as
already mentioned. In the German case, there is an ongoing debate
about revoking favorable tax legislation, taking into account that the
first years of the present decade have seen German film funds investing
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more than US$ 1 billion annually, mostly in Hollywood (Meza, 2005;
Krämer, 2008: 245). Nevertheless, other financial sources have
substituted them, through bank financing and private-equity investors,
together with more efficient tax policies, as we will explain later on
(Brass, 2007a; Gubbins, 2007a, 2007c).
According to some industry insiders, the European-American film
co-productions are going to increase –as well as Asian-American
ones– due to the internationalization of the film business. At present,
the American domestic market represents only one third of the total
box office grossed by Hollywood movies. David Linde, co-chairman
of Universal studios, asserts that nowadays “audiences are hardly
asking for more [movies] from America. Films are made everywhere,
set everywhere and tell stories about people everywhere” (Gubbins,
2007a).
Recent examples are the agreements between European and US film
companies. In the UK, for instance, Working Title joined Universal
Pictures back in 1999. Some of its recent films, designed as US-
British-French co-productions, are Nanny McPhee (2005), directed
by Kirk Jones and starring Emma Thompson, co-produced also with
MGM and Studio Canal (France), with an estimated budget of € 30
million; and the acclaimed United 93 (2006), directed by Peter
Greengrass and co-produced, also with Studio Canal, on a US$ 15
million budget. In a similar way as Working Title, the Spanish
production outfit KanZaman was created to co-produce
internationally –mainly with US and UK. Among their last films co-
produced with US companies are Sahara (B. Eisner, 2005),
Kingdom of Heaven (R. Scott, 2005) and Basic Instinct 2 (M. Caton-
Jones, 2006).
Other illustrative cases would be the latest Milos Forman’s film,
Goya’s Ghosts (2006), starring Javier Bardem, Natalie Portman and
Stellan Skasgard, co-produced between the American independent
producer Saul Saentz and the Spanish company Xuxa, with an
estimated budget of € 29 million. And the latest Coppola film, Youth
Without Youth (2007) a co-production between American Zoetrope and
Pathé, shot in Bucarest (Green, 2005b; Tartaglione, 2005).
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Lastly, the recent agreement between the Swiss-based production,
financing and sales company Omega Entertainment and the US-
based film production firm Baldwin Entertainment Group also
proves the consolidation of this trend. Both companies aim to act as
a single global financing, production and sales outfit, producing and
distributing up to 10 films a year in the US$ 10-60 million range
(Kay, 2007b).
5.3. Exchange of Talent and Creativity (Remakes)
Hollywood also moves to appropriate foreign talent when it can,
drawing promising actors and directors from all over the world to
work on its projects, on a mutual benefit agreement (Behlil, 2007:
24-35). In the case of European talents, such high profile European
stars as Hugh Grant, Antonio Banderas, Jude Law, Javier Bardem,
Catherine Zeta-Jones, Penélope Cruz, Sophie Marceau, Franka
Potente, Monica Bellucci or Diane Kruger now form part of the
Hollywood constellation. The same could be affirmed in relation to
a number of European film directors (British aside), some of them
considered ‘commercially-driven’, like Wolfgang Petersen, Paul
Verhoven or Renny Harlin, and some others who could fit more into
the category of ‘auteurs’, like Jean Pierre Jeunet, Wim Wenders or
Theo Angelopoulos. It could be said that almost every promising
European director has received ‘a Hollywood offer’ after his or her
outstanding directorial debut (Morrison, 1998). In recent times,
directors like Tom Tykwer (Run, Lola Run, 1998) or Peter
Greengrass (Bloody Sunday, 2002) have initiated their Hollywood
tenure. In addition, many of the recent Hollywood blockbusters have
been directed by European talent like Ridley Scott (Gladiator,
2000), Sam Mendes (American Beauty, 1999) and Roland
Emmerich (The Day After Tomorrow, 2004) –a fact that is becoming
a standard (Goodridge, 2000). 
In her recent and complete research focused on foreign directors
working in the US, Melis Behlil stipulates that around 10-20% of
the new films yearly released in the US are directed by foreign
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talent, being the majority percentage European (Behlil, 2007: 30).
According to this author, “Hollywood wants and needs the global
talent for a number of reasons”. First of all, “for producing high-
quality output in entertainment industries” and specially in regard to
those directors “who have already demonstrated a full grasp of the
Hollywood style”. In addition, “to weaken various local film
industries that can pose a threat”. And at the same time, as a way of
“servicing the local markets of the filmmakers’ native countries”
(ibid.: 34).
This ‘talent traffic’ is also two-way, especially in the case of actors and
actresses. The presence of American stars in European movies has also
been regular. Recent examples are Nicole Kidman (The Others, 2001,
and Dogville, 2003), Adrien Brody (The Pianist, 2002; Manolete,
2007), Viggo Mortensen (Alatriste, 2006) or Dustin Hoffman
(Perfume: The Story of a Murderer, 2007).
The US majors’ presence in European production and distribution
allows them to better identify potential talent that can then be
incorporated into the Hollywood system. Miramax smartly hired
producers David Aukin and Colin Leventhal from the UK’s Channel 4
to start their own production house in Britain, and Hollywood’s on-the-
ground presence in local countries has helped them find talents like
screenwriter/director Richard Curtis and Spanish starlet Paz Vega
(Laporte, 2004; Minns, 1997). In this sense, note must be taken of the
effort of some European initiatives to promote young European stars
and to help them travel across national boundaries. One of such efforts
was the European Film Promotion’s Shooting Stars launched in 1997.
Nonetheless, the argument about the existence of a real European star-
system remains open (Macnab, 2007d).
Hollywood also scours European films for remake possibilities,
seeking rights to films that have the potential to be converted into big-
budget American films (Seguin, 2002b). According to Elsaesser, as
mentioned before, far from being a negative phenomenon, this tactic
should be taken as a high compliment towards European creativity
(Elsaesser, 2005: 493). On her part, Behlil explains why these days are
witnessing an increase of remakes:
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Although Hollywood’s interest in remaking films from other countries
has been a constant part of the business since the very early days of
sound film, this tendency has increased visibly with the advent of
‘New Hollywood’, or the ‘blockbuster era’… the popularity of
remakes in this era is related to the studios’ desire to use sources that
are ‘presold’ in other media, that have already proven their popularity
in other markets… The blockbuster era saw an increase in these ‘safe’
productions (Behlil, 2007: 94-95). 
Among the remake possibilities, European films have been frequent
mirror for Hollywood. In this regard, Behlil adds:
As a source of inspiration and talent from the 1920s on, Hollywood
has followed Europe… The dualities between Hollywood and
Europe that uphold the European films as ‘unique work of art’
versus Hollywood’s ‘standardized commodities’ reappear in much
of the discourse surrounding these remakes, despite the fact the
European originals are popular genre films. Looking toward Europe
in search of new ideas had been standard practice for Hollywood…
(ibid.: 98)
Table 9 includes some examples taken from the last two decades.
Disney scooped up French Un Indien dans la Ville (1994) to make
Jungle 2 Jungle (1997), Spanish Open Your Eyes (Abre los ojos, 1997)
was bought by Paramount to serve as the basis for Vanilla Sky (2001)
and the German-Italian-Austrian-Swiss co-production Bella Martha
(2001) became No Reservations (2007). Other cases include The
Ladykillers (1955, 2004), The Italian Job (1969, 2003), Willy Wonka
and the Chocolate Factory (1971, 2005). Very recently The Weinsteins
Company announced the English-language remake of the German film
The Lives of Others (2006), winner of the Academy Award for Best
Foreign Film of the year, to be produced by Anthony Minghella and
Sidney Pollack (Mirage Productions). Also Sony Pictures
Entertainment acquired rights to Handmade’s US-based remake of
British gangland classic The Long Good Friday (1980) (Kay, 2007f;
Macnab, 2007c). A more unusual case is the European remake of a
Hollywood film, although there are also some examples like E’ gia ieri
(2004), an Italian-Spanish remake of Groundhog Day (1993) (Seguin,
2002a; Stanley, 2005).
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Table 9. 
Examples of US remakes of European Films
Source: Own elaboration on imdb data.
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Remaked
Film
Year Country Director Original
Film
Year Country Director
The 
Vanishing
1993 US G. Sluizer¨ Spoorloos 1988 DK G. Sluizer
The 
Birdcage
1996 US M. Nichols La cage
aux 
follies
1978 FR, IT E. Molinaro
Jungle 2
Jungle 
1997 US J. Pasquin Un In-
dien dans
la Ville 
1994 FR H. Palud
Night-
watch
1998 US O. Bordenal Natteva-
gen
1994 DK O. Bordenal
City of 
Angels 1998
DE, US B. 
Silberling
Der 
Himmel
über 
Berlin
1987 DE W. Wenders
Just 
Visiting
2001 US, FR J. M. Poiré Les 
Visiteurs
1993 FR J. M. Poiré
Vanilla
Sky 
2001 US C. Crowe Abre los
ojos
1997 ES A. 
Amenábar
The 
Italian
Job 
2003 US, FR,
IT
F. Gary
Gray
The 
Italian
Job 
1966 UK P. Collinson
Alfie 2004 UK, US C. Shyer Alfie 1966 UK L. Gilbert
The 
Ladyki-
llers 
2004 US Cohen Bros. The 
Ladyki-
llers 
1995 UK A. 
Macken-
drick
Taxi 2004 US, FR T. Story Taxi 1998 FR G. Pirés
Charlie
and the
Chocolate
Factory
2005 US, UK T. Burton Willy
Wonka
and the
Chocolate
Factory
1971 FR M. Stuart
Sleuth 2007 US K. 
Brannagh
Sleuth 1972 UK J. L. 
Mankiewiz
No Reser-
vations
2007 US, AU S. Hicks Bella
Martha
2001 DE, IT S. 
Nettelbeck
It is interesting to observe in this table how some of these European
remakes are in fact “autoremakes”, as Behlil points out (ibid.: 96-97).
According to the small number of cases, although they usually imply
‘the first Hollywood opportunity’ for the respective directors, the end
results don’t use to garner critical or commercial success. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning the singular remake strategy of
Icelander producer Joni Sighvatsson, based in Los Angeles, whose
production credits include Wild at Heart (1990), Basquiat (1996) and
K-19: The Widowmaker (2002). Sighvatsson has recently packaged an
English-language remake of the acclaimed 2004 Danish film
Aftermath (Lad De Sma Born) to be directed by Russian Vadim
Perelman –whose films include the 2003 Oscar nominated House of
Sand and Fog. Similarly, Sighvatsson recently announced the remake
of Susanne Bier’s 2004 Danish hit Brothers (Broder) that Jim Sheridan
will direct (Kay, 2007g). In my view, this last case –a Scandinavian
producer based in Hollywood and remaking European local hits in the
US aimed at the international English-language market– exemplifies
the intricate mixture of creative exchange and sharing of know-how
between Europe and Hollywood.
5.4. Runaway Productions and Foreign Service 
Production
Another major area of cooperation is the Hollywood ‘runaway
production’. More and more, Hollywood seeks to produce many of its
films overseas for economic (tax incentives and reduced labor costs),
creative (exotic locations) and even marketing reasons (shooting as a
‘local event’), taking into account “the hypermobility of contemporary
film production” (Goldsmith & O’Reagan, 2005a: 9-10). According to
a recent report by the US Center for Entertainment Industry Data &
Research, international locations account for more than half of all film
shootings (McNary, 2006).
Ben Goldsmith and Tom O’Reagan, in their comprehensive study of
film studio facilities around the world, explain that this global dispersal
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is a product of three interconnected factors, which refleet mutual
benefits:
First, the further development of the blockbuster as a project-based
system of production has allowed diverse inputs from a more
globally defined industry than has been hitherto possible. Second, a
large number of locations have been able to form and pursue a
location interest and provide the package of studios, other facilities,
services, and natural and built environments necessary for
blockbuster production… Third, the combination of the design
interest of the Hollywood majors in developing projects and the
location interest of places in securing projects has given rise to
interrelated dynamics of global geographic dispersal at the level of
the production shoot, and concentration in Los Angeles at the level
of production design… The design and location interests therefore
coincide in their mutual aim to transform “episodic project
collaboration” into “more enduring project networks” (Goldsmith &
O’Reagan, 2005a: 19)
All these strategic and logistical movements related to film
production –the establishment of studio facilities as well as
provision of effective production infrastructures, direct and indirect
governmental support, development of clusters and creative
industries, synergies between local and international industries–
illustrate, as some authors have pointed out, the growing interest of
the so-called ‘foreign film production services’ (Goldsmith &
O’Reagan, 2005c: 59-63).
In this sense, Canada, Europe, Australia, Mexico and East Asia have
become the destination of significant Hollywood investments.
Canadian production, for example, nearly tripled to US$ 1.2 billion;
production in the UK and Ireland rose 66% to US$ 809 million;
spending in Australia and New Zealand more than quintupled to US$
717 million; and Eastern European production soared from US$ 30
million to US$ 308 million (McNary, 2006).
In Europe, particularly, old film studios have been rebuilt, improved
and even merged in order to attract big American productions. This
is the case of Pinewood-Shepperton Studios and Elstree Studios in
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the UK, Cinnecità in Rome, Studio Babelsberg in Berlin or
Barrandov Studios in Prague (Goldsmith & O’Reagan, 2005a: 109-
149). Other Eastern European countries have developed competitive
studio facilities and services, like Hungary (Sándor Korda),
Bulgaria (Boyana Studios) and Romania (MediaPro Studios). In
addition, new film studio complexes have been built up from
scratch, like the so-called Ciudad de la Luz in the Mediterranean
coast of Spain or the big film studio set up by Dino De Laurentiis
in Morocco (Rodier, 2005a; Vivarelli, 2007). National and local
government support –from direct investment in film studio
refurbishing to tax breaks and indirect subsidies– has facilitated this
policy in many cases (Goldsmith & O’Reagan, 2005b: 44-54). By
way of example, in the present decade Cinnecità has hosted the
shooting of U-571 (2000), Gangs of New York (2002) or The Passion
of the Christ (2003). Barrandov Studios were chosen for The
Bourne Identity (2001), XXX (2002) and Hellboy (2003).
Babelsberg was the facility for Around the World in 80 Days (2004),
starring Jackie Chang, or The Bourne Supremacy (2004). Pinewood-
Shepperton was hired for Die Another Day (2002), Lara Croft-Tomb
Raider: The Cradle of Life (2003) and Sahara (2005). Finally, La
Ciudad de la Luz has been the production facility for Manolete
(2007), starring Adrien Brody and Penélope Cruz and will be
probably hosting Pompeii, originally to be directed by Roman
Polanski (scheduled for 2009).
As table 10 reflects, after becoming a new filmmaking frontier a
decade ago, Eastern Europe is now flourishing as a main center of
film activity, being a main competitor for Western European studio
facilities. The region has the infrastructure and skilled crews to
attract a great number of big-budget Hollywood productions and, on
top of that, Hollywood producers are saving below-the-line dollars
converted to local currencies –between 20% and 40% of production
costs, according to some sources (Vivarelli, 2007). Besides basic
costs, facility quality and crew expertise, the other attractive
incentives are tax rebates, regional funds and easy access to
previously off-limit spots to mirror famous Western European
buildings and monuments. The battle to lure outside productions to
European locations and studios is getting fiercer.
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Table 10. 
Hollywood ‘Runaway Productions’ in Europe
Source: Own elaboration on different sources.
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Title Director Year Film Studio City / Country
U-571 J. Mostow 2000 Cinecittà Rome, Italy
Dungeons and Dragons C. Solomon 2000 Barrandov Prague, Chezch Rep.
The Bourne Identity D. Liman 2001 Barrandov Prague, Chezch Rep.
Blade II: Bloodlust G. del Toro 2001 Barrandov Prague, Chezch Rep.
Gangs of New York M. Scorsese 2002 Cinecittà Rome, Italy
Hart’s War G. Hoblit 2002 Barrandov Prague, Chezch Rep.
Bad Company J. Schumacher 2002 Barrandov Prague, Chezch Rep.
XXX R. Cohen 2002 Barrandov Prague, Chezch Rep.
Die Another Day L. Tamahori 2002 Pinewood Iver Heat, UK
The Passion of the Christ M. Gibson 2003 Cinecittà Rome, Italy
Hellboy G. del Toro 2003 Barrandov Prague, Chezch Rep.
Lara Croft-Tom Raider: The
Cradle of Life
J. de Bont 2003 Pinewood Iver Heat, UK
Around the World in 
80 Days
F. Coraci 2004 Babelsberg Berlin, Germany
The Bourne Supremacy P. Greengrass 2004 Babelsberg Berlin, Germany
Beyond the Sea K. Spacey 2004 Pinewood/Babelsberg UK, Germany
Sahara B. Eisner 2005 Pinewood Iver Heat, UK
The Cave B. Hunt 2005 MediaPro Bucharest, Romania
The Black Dahlia B. De Palma 2006 Boyana Sofia, Bulgaria
Casino Royale M. Campbell 2006 Barrandov/Pinewood Chezch R., UK
The Black Dahlia B. De Palma 2006 Boyana Sofia, Bulgaria
The Contract B. Beresford 2006 Boyana Sofia, Bulgaria
Eragon S. Fangmeier 2006 Pinewood Iver Heat, UK
The Golden Compass C. Weitz 2007 Pinewood Iver Heat, UK
The Bourne Ultimatum P. Greengrass 2007 Pinewood Iver Heat, UK
The Seeker: The Dark is
Rising 
D. Cunningham 2007 MediaPro Bucharest, Romania
Town Creek J. Schumacher 2008 MediaPro Bucharest, Romania
Hellboy 2: The Golden
Army
G. del Toro 2008 Sándor Korda Eytiek, Hungary
Valkyrie B. Singer 2008 Babelsberg Berlin, Germany
The Shepherd: Border Patrol I. Florentine 2008 Nu Image Sofia, Bulgaria
Transsiberian B. Anderson 2008 LKS Vilnius, Lithuania
Defiance E. Zwick 2008 LKS Vilnius, Lithuania
Speed Racer Wachowski Bros. 2008 Babelsberg Berlin, Germany
Quantum of Solace M. Foster 2008 Pinewood Iver Heat, UK
James Bond installment Casino Royale defected to the East last year,
when most of the movie was shot at Prague’s Barrandov Studios and
on locations in the Czech Republic, against the initial plans to shot at
London’s Pinewood. Then Barrandov and Pinewood have been vying
to become the main center for the last Bond movie Quantum of Solace
(2008) –although this time the British studio won. Prague has also
hosted the sequel of The Chronicles of Narnia (Prince Caspian) and
Luc Besson’s Babylon A.D., an action-science fiction movie starring
Vin Diesel –both to be released in 2008.
Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania are also starting to attract Hollywood
productions. Joel Schumacher’s horror picture Town Creek (2008) has
been shot at Bucharest’s MediaPro Studios. On the same lot, Walden
Media and Fox’s US$ 50 million fantasy The Seeker: The Dark is
Rising (2007) has been produced there with local technicians. Other
American productions shot in Romania are Adam Resurrected (2008)
a Holocaust-related movie directed by Paul Schrader and starring
Willem Dafoe and Jeff Goldblum, as well as Mirrors (2008), a thriller
starring Kiefer Sutherland –both co-produced by local Castel Films.
Also Francis Ford Coppola used a Romanian crew for Youth Without
Youth (2007) his micro-budget return to student-style filmmaking, shot
entirely in the region. 
Bulgaria is also increasing its film activities through Boyana Studios,
where Brian De Palma’s The Black Dahlia (2006) and Bruce
Beresford’s The Contract (2006) where shot. Another Bulgarian studio
facility, Nu Image, has hosted Jean-Claude Van Damme starrer The
Shepherd: Border Patrol (2008). This country is such a good option
that US producer Phillip Roth is building a huge stage complex and a
back lot outside Sofia. Regarding Hungary, Budapest is hosting
Guillermo del Toro’s Hellboy 2: The Golden Army, for which
Universal will benefit from Hungary’s 20% tax refund.
Even Lithuania, with LKS film studios, is becoming a player. This
country has been hosting Defiance (2008), a World War II action
movie recounting the story of a Jewish resistance movement in the
Polish-Belarussian forests, produced by Ed Zwick and Pieter Jan
Brugge. This US$ 50 million film was a major victory for Lithuania, a
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country of 3.4 million people, which beat out bigger Poland and
Romania as potential shooting sites. Also the Brad Anderson’s last
horror picture, Transsiberian (2008) starring Woody Harrelson and
Ben Kingsley, was entirely shot in Lithuania and China.
For all these post-communist economies, international movie production
is a bonanza. According to Dusana Chrenekova, spokeswoman for
Barrandov Studios, foreign movie productions brought some US$ 76
million to the Czech Republic in 2006. On his part, Bogdan Moncea,
marketing director of Castel Film in Romania, said foreign film studios
over the past five years have injected over US$ 183 million into the local
economy (Vivarelli, 2007; Dapkus, 2007).
Western Europe, however, has risen to the Eastern challenge. Germany
recently launched a 20% tax rebate that Warner Brothers will take
advantage of for the Wachowski brothers’ Speed Racer to be shot in
2008 at Berlin’s Babelsberg Studios instead of other possibilities.
“Within Europe, it is always a mixture of reasons where a film goes”,
says Carl Woebcken, CEO and president of Studio Babelsberg. “One
important issue, of course, is the overall cost. The new subsidy from
the German Federal Film Fund (DFFF) helps because the above-the-
line costs are also incentivised. On Speed Racer, for example, the U$
12.2 million (€ 9 million) rebate is more than the total costs for the
stages and the complete set construction” (Blaney, 2007d). In Spain,
greater tax breaks are promised under a new cinema law. Meanwhile,
the government of region of Valencia launched a cash incentive
program in 2007, offering up to US$ 7 million for those film
productions which spend three weeks of shooting in Valencia,
including two at Alicante’s new Ciudad de la Luz studios. Similarly, a
20% tax credit is available to films spending 25% of their budgets in
the UK. For that reason, among others, The Golden Compass (2007)
and The Bourne Ultimatum (2007) stood firm at London’s Pinewood
(Vivarelli, 2007).
Nevertheless, competition also exists among premier Eastern
European countries, where each studio does what it can to entice
foreign productions, particularly now that the region has become
considerably more expensive. Filming costs are 20% lower in
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Romania, Bulgaria and Lithuania than in the Czech Republic or
Poland, although they lack in some cases the proper infrastructure and
high-quality specialists (ibid.).
In order to keep this regular flow of Hollywood productions, Eastern
European countries must improve in technology, experience and even
tax reductions. Government support can mean the difference. In
Hungary, the government has approved a 20% tax break for movie
productions, and Romania may follow suit. Incentives like these show
to what extent countries are willing to go to keep producers returning
and why film-making is here to stay (Vivarelli, 2007; Dapkus, 2007).
There is of course a negative side of the runaway productions. From the
‘host country’s’ standpoint, it must be said that Hollywood productions
overseas help bring money into local industries, but also makes them
dependent on a fragile foundation. The amount of foreign production is
generally insufficient to provide business for everyone, and American
runaway production levels are very dependent on currency fluctuations,
tax break schemes and labor costs. Countries compete to undercut each
other with better film schemes instead of working together, and an entire
national industry can be critically destabilized if foreign production
leaves (Nadler, 2004a, 2004b). In the case of Europe, as already
mentioned, Western countries like the UK or Ireland, long the choice
spots for Hollywood productions, are being abandoned by productions
that are enticed to Eastern countries with even more extensive aid
schemes, like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania or Bulgaria
(Macnab, 2006; Schwinke, 2006). Tellingly, England’s loss of the
production of the Star Wars franchise from its Pinewood studios in 2001
was seen as a more important turn of events than anything that happened
in its local production sector. In a similar way, as remarked earlier,
Pinewood-Shepperton Studios have been struggling against Barrandov
Studios to retain one of the most successful film franchises, the Bond
series –the last installment, Casino Royale (2006) was shot in UK and
Czech republic after hard pressure from both production facilities
(Macnab, 2007b; Parker, 2002).
From the US point of view, runaway productions have had a very
negative impact on several levels. According to the report mentioned
before, “the lure of foreign incentives –and their aid to the bottom line–
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for feature films has cost the U.S. economy 47,000 jobs per year since
2000, and US$ 23 billion in economic benefits” (McNary, 2006).
There has been a great debate in the US with political pressure on
Hollywood producers to shoot on American soil. Nevertheless, as
Goldsmith and O’Reagan points out,
[t]hese controversies might be best thought of as signs of the
difficult adjustment by American-based production to the
circumstance of an increasingly globalized design and production
regime in which Los Angeles –and American more generally– are
simply other possible locations pitching for production (Goldsmith
& O’Reagan, 2005a: 177).
In any case, as competition for production increases and tax break
policies overseas scale down in some countries, many US states have
been fast to launch competitive and even innovative tax incentive
programs. States like Michigan, Washington, Mississippi, North
Carolina or Iowa offer a straight refund of between 10% and 30% of
local expenditures, with a cap of US$ 1 to 5 million (Hazelton, 2007).
Very recently, Sony Pictures Imageworks –the special effects branch of
Sony-Columbia– announced that they had decided to move more than
100 jobs from Culver City to New Mexico, where they have built a
100,000-square-foot satellite facility. This movement will allow them
to substantially cut costs amid heightened competition from rivals in
Canada, England and other countries that offer production incentives
that are unavailable in California. New Mexico, on the contrary,
provides a combined 25% rebate on taxable production and post-
production expenses (Verrier, 2007). 
At the same time, the EU has recently cut back on the amount that
countries can benefit from public subsidies by determining that only
50% of work needs to be done in any one country to qualify for local
aid programs. According to some analysts, this may calm some of
the divisive competition or it may further weaken the already fragile
local industries (Stern, 2004). On the contrary, as mentioned earlier,
some European countries are very willing to attract foreign film
productions and compete by offering better tax break conditions and
low production costs (Macnab, 2006; Schwinke, 2006; Gubbins,
2007d).
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6. Strategies of Competition
The second major set of strategies for the European film industry is
competition. Rather than working with Hollywood, these tactics seek
ways to beat them at their own game, creating commercially viable
filmmaking structures that will allow Europeans to fight for control of
the audiovisual marketplace. There are six main strategies in this
category: 1) production of European ‘blockbusters’; 2) production of
English-language European films; 3) emulating Hollywood strategies
of sequels, comic adaptation and company branding; 4) pan-European
private and public financial initiatives; 5) strong distribution
companies (also pan-European size) and 6) promotion of national or
local films as different products from mainstream Hollywood movies.
6.1. European ‘Blockbusters’
Hollywood’s dominance of the worldwide markets has led many in the
European film industry to advocate the production of internationally-
aimed, big budget films that can compete for audiences on the world
stage. These films are generally too expensive for all but the largest
vertically integrated European producers, and they frequently require
the international co-production formula. At their best, these European
“blockbusters” are able to compete directly with their Hollywood
counterparts and earn similar international grosses. Nevertheless, by
putting themselves in direct competition with Hollywood, they risk
looking poor by comparison as well (De Pablos, 2004).
In any case, the European film industry is firmly eager to compete
with Hollywood in the international arena, encouraging co-
productions among different European countries and/or seeking the
support of American partners. In the first case, the danger of the so-
called “europuddings” –those film productions made as an artificial
and unnatural mixture of European elements, trying to be ‘all things
to all Europeans’, and therefore being rejected by everyone– very
frequent some years ago, are currently avoided (Jäckel, 2003: 108).
Good examples of successful multi-national European blockbusters
would be The Barber of Siberia (1998), co-produced by Rusia,
France, Italy and Chezch Republic; Enemy at the Gates (2001), a co-
production among Germany, UK, Ireland and US; The Pianist
(2002), co-produced by France, UK, Germany and Poland; and
Perfume: The Story of a Murderer (2006), a German-Spanish-French
co-production.
There has also been pressure to film in English, rather than in local
languages, along with pressure to use recognizable –and marketable–
stars. This is the case of Bruce Willis speaking in English in France’s
The Fifth Element (Le cinquème element, 1997), Nicole Kidman in the
Spanish film The Others (Los otros, 2001), Jude Law and Ed Harris in
the US-European co-production Enemy at the Gates (2001) or Adrien
Brody in the Polish war drama The Pianist (2002). Nevertheless, there
are also other examples of big European productions shot in local
languages with no stars at all, like the successful Life is Beautiful (La
vita e bella, 1999), Amelie (Le fabuleux destin d’Amélie Poulain,
2001), The Downfall (Der Untergang, 2004) or Alatriste (2006).
Interestingly, some of these big productions designed to compete with
Hollywood are now actually made with Hollywood support. Almost all
high budgeted British films are made jointly with American majors,
and throughout the European continent producers are looking to get
Hollywood to put up money for distribution in foreign territories. Thus
Miramax funded a portion of Italy’s Life is Beautiful (La vita è bella,
1997) and Spain’s The Others (Los otros, 2001) for example, securing
them lucrative releases in the United States. In recent years, as
explained before, most of US majors have developed a strategy of co-
producing locally overseas, and in many cases making possible big-
budget projects (Kay, 2007a).
Table 11 lists some examples of these European blockbusters,
including admissions in European territories as well as in the US.
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Table 11. 
Examples of European ‘Blockbusters’
Notes:
1 In case of multi-national co-productions, domestic admissions are referred to the main
co-producing country. 
2 Domestic admissions excluded.
Source: Own elaboration on EAO-Lumiere and Boxoffice mojo databases.
In view of some of the next film projects announced, this tendency to
produce big-budgeted European movies is going to continue. Apart
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Title Direc-
tor
Year Budget
(US$ m)
Coun-
try
Domestic
1
Admis.
EU (25)2
US Total
The
Fifth
Ele-
ment
L. 
Besson
1997 90.0 FR 7,514,000 20,207,134 13,607,714 41,328,848
Life is
Beauti-
ful
R. 
Benigni 1997 25.0 IT 5,725,955 19,168,097 11,545,930 36,439,982
Asterix
and
Obelix
C. Zidi 1999 48.0 FR 9,090,000 20,987,331 256,703 30,334,034
Enemy
at the
Gates
J.J. 
Annaud
2001 70.0 US, DE,
GB, IE
: 4,064,117 9,536,504 13,600,621
The
Others
A.
Amená-
bar
2001 17.0 ES 6,356,679 14,416,606 17,907,734 38,681,019
Amelie J.P. 
Jeunet
2001 13.5 FR 9,290,535 20,696,885 5,921,234 35,908,654
The
Pianist
R. Po-
lanski
2002 35.0 GB, DE,
FR, PL
: 8,739,120 5,231,024 13,970,144
Cold
Moun-
tain
A.
Ming-
hella
2003 79.0 GB, US,
RO, IT
: 6,198,077 15,610,596 21,808,673
A Very
Long
Enga-
gement
J.P. 
Jeunet
2004 55.0 FR 4,230,000 4,476,543 427,214 9,133,757
The 
Down-
fall
O. 
Hirs-
chbiegel
2004 13.5 DE 4,521,903 5,295,204 : 9,817,107
from Goya’s Ghosts, directed by Milos Forman and designed as a
European-US co-production, one could also mention Memoirs of
Hadrian (2007) a € 21 million movie directed by John Boorman, co-
produced by Italy’s Movieweb and France’s UGC, starring Spanish
actress Paz Vega (Rodier, 2005c).
Also in connection with this trend is the resurgence of the epic (and
biopic) genre in Europe, usually designed as high budget period-piece
film productions. Examples of recently released titles are Spanish
Alatriste (2006), starring Viggo Mortensen, which cost around € 24
million, Paul Verhoven’s Black Book (Zwartboek, 2006), budgeted at €
16 million, and Sergei Bodrov’s historical epic Mongol, a € 15 million
co-production of several countries, presented as a first installment of a
Genghis Khan biopic, shot in the Mongolian language. Other coming
European biopic films include Margaret Von Trotta’s movie about the
poet, composer and theologian Hildegard von Bingen; Renny Harlin’s
portrait of Finnish historical legend CGE Mannerheim, in the € 10
million budget range; and Michael Hoffman’s € 12 million Tolstoy
drama The Last Station with James McAvoy, Helen Mirren and
Christopher Plummer. Another coming epic family story is the
Heinrich Breloer’s lavish adaptation of Thomas Mann’s Nobel Prize-
winning novel Die Buddenbrooks, a € 15 million production leaded by
the veteran actor Armin Müeller-Stahl (Blaney, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c,
2007i; Rossing Jensen, 2007b; Wendt Jensen, 2007).
6.2. European English-Language Films
English-language filmmaking was once seen as necessary for real
international success, as much for its popularity with buyers as with
audiences. Filming in English allows filmmakers to avoid the stigma
of “Europeanness” for audiences looking for Hollywood-type fare
(Frater, 1996). As the language of Hollywood, English is the language
of international filmmaking, and it is the language most universally
understood by Europeans. In addition, this strategy solves the problem
identified by Higson, when he remarks that “language barriers between
different European countries have hampered this sort of pan-national
cooperation” (Higson, 2000: 241).
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Distributors are much more apt to pick up foreign films –and to pay
more money for them– if they are made in English, though English
is no guarantee for box office success (Kemp, 1998). As a
consequence, there is an increasing number of European films shot in
the English-language every year, from big productions like Manolete
(M. Meyjes, 2008, Spain) to very ‘auteristic’ titles like Dogville (L.
Von Trier, 2003, Denmark), not to mention period pieces like Dina
(O. Bordenal, 2002, Norway) and Tea with Mussolini (F. Zefirelli,
1999, Italy) or simple dramas like The Secret Life of Words (I. Coixet,
2005, Spain).
Following this trend, 2007 has been quite a prolific year for English-
language debuts of well-known European film directors. To begin
with, during the Cannes Film Festival that year, the veteran Finnish
film director Abbas Kiarostami announced his first English-language
production. The US$ 6 million Certified Copy, starring Juliette
Binoche and produced by Marin Karmitz’s MK2, was shot in Italy
with a European crew. Similarly, the Greek master Theo Angelopoulos
has undertaken his first film in English, The Dust of Time, the second
part of the trilogy initiated three years ago with The Weeping Meadow.
This US$ 12.3 million multi-national co-production (Germany-Russia-
France-Italy) relies on a first-class international cast including Irene
Jacob, Willem Dafoe, Bruno Ganz and Harvey Keitel. Other examples
are German Sandra Nettelbeck, who shot in Canada the drama Helen,
starring Ashley Judd, Goran Visnjic and Lauren Lee Smith. And the
Swedish Lukas Moodysson, who directed Mammoth a Swedish-
German-Danish co-production shot in New York, Thailand, The
Philippines and Sweden (A. Carver, 2007; Macnab, 2007a; Grivas,
2007 ; Kay, 2007e). A final example –although not properly a debut–
is Menno Meyjes’ next film Last Battle Dreamer, a US$ 20 million
Viking epic adventure starring Ryan Phillippe, Abbie Cornish and
Sean Bean, co-produced by UK and Germany, and backed by Future
Films with Handmade Films International handling international sales
(Mitchell, 2007a).
As mentioned earlier, this trend coexists with an opposite one.
European producers are also by-passing English in favor of a more
authentic local-language sensibility, even for internationally-aimed
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films, as occurs with the series of Asterix and Obelix (1999, 2002,
2007), the Spanish Alatriste (2006), or the German The Downfall (Der
Untergang, 2006).
In addition, some European production companies have re-oriented
their production output to accomplish this goal or have been directly
created for this purpose. This is the case, for instance, of the above
mentioned Spanish firm KanZaman, very active in these last years;
or the Berlin production powerhouse X Filme, whose recent
international production credits include Maria Schrader’s Love Life
(Liebesleben, 2006) and Bille August’s Goodbye Bafana (2007). X
Filme has launched a subsidiary company, X Filme International, to
concentrate on the production of one to two international co-
productions per year for the global market, in a budget range of US$
6.4 million-12.8 million (€ 5-10 million). Its first project has been
Michael Haneke’s English remake of his Funny Games, with
France’s Celluloid Dreams, the UK’s Tartan Films and Halcyon
Pictures. Likewise, Filmax, a Spanish production firm, is aimed at
the international market, and its recent titles include The Machinist
(2004), starring Christian Bale, and Transsiberian (2007), with
Emily Mortimer, Woody Harrelson and Ben Kingsley, both directed
by Brad Anderson (Blaney, 2003b, 2006b).
6.3. Emulating Hollywood: Sequels, Franchising,
Comic Adaptations and Company Branding
From the growth in merchandising and product placement to the rise
of the movie franchise, branding has become central to the modern
blockbuster economy under the emergent principle of ‘total
entertainment’ (Grainge, 2007). Hollywood knows very well that, in
the contemporary movie business, the logic of branding has propelled
specific kinds of approach to the status and selling of film. In this
regard, the European film industry has also looked to emulate this
Hollywood tactics as it seeks to increase revenue and competitiveness,
especially in the case of sequels, adaptations from comics, creation of
franchises and the company branding. 
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Sequels in Europe are now more frequent than ever before, as producers
try to tap into the built-in audiences that Hollywood has so successfully
exploited (Variety, 2001). Producers have increasingly relied on the
repeat success of films like the trilogies of Taxi and Les Bronzes in
France, the Torrente films in Spain and the Natale saga in Italy.
In relation to comic adaptation, there are examples from different
countries like France or Spain, which include national best-sellers like
the Asterix & Obelix series (1999, 2002, 2008), Les Dalton (2004) and
Blueberry (2004) in France; Mortadelo y Filemón (2003, 2008) and the
upcoming Captain Thunder in Spain.
The emphasis on franchises reflects a growing understanding of the
potential of the international market. Franchising is increasingly
important in Europe as well, though often with a distinctly different
twist. On the one hand, the previous examples of sequels and comic
adaptations are also examples of franchises. On the other, whereas
franchises in Hollywood mainly refer to successful movies like
Spiderman or Pirates of the Caribbean, for Europeans, harkening back
to their auteurist traditions, franchises usually take the shape of
individual filmmakers like Lars Von Trier, Pedro Almodóvar, Wim
Wenders or Nani Moretti. As Thomas Elsaeseer has pointed out, auteurs
in Europe are brand names by themselves (Elsaesser, 2005: 51-52).
Regarding the strategy of company branding, some recent examples
can be found. In 2001, the Spanish production company Filmax
created Fantastic Factory for ‘B serie’ internationally appealing
(English) horror movies. More recently, UK-based financing, sales and
distribution company Intandem Films recently joined efforts with three
other UK production companies (Spice Factory, Studio of the North
and Ballpark Productions) to create a new production brand named
FearFactory, also aimed at producing horror films and psychological
thrillers. In a similar way, Danish major Nordisk Film’s Norwegian
subsidiary, which has become a market leader in local film and
television production has launched a new production outfit, Neo Film,
to concentrate on smaller projects, still mainstream-oriented, for the
more critical audience. Two more examples already mentioned are the
case of the German production company X Filme launching a
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subsidiary company X Filme International focused on international co-
productions and Xuxa Producciones, a spin-off of the Spanish
KanZaman, also aimed at multinational films (Screen Daily, 2007e).
Table 12. 
Examples of European Sequels and Franchises
Source: Own elaboration on EAO-Lumiere database.
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Admissions
Orig. Title Year Director Domestic EU (25) Total
France • Asterix 1 
(against Cesar)
• Asterix 2 
(Mission Cleopatre)
• Asterix 3 (in the
Olympic Games)
1999
2002
2008
C. Zidi
A. Chabat
F. Forestier
8,737,422
14,313,142
n/a
2,895,053
7,212,799
n/a
11,632,475
21,525,941
n/a
• Taxi 1
• Taxi 2
• Taxi 3
1998
2002
2003
G. Pirés
G. Krwaczyk
G. Krwaczyk
6,516,614
10,235,516
6,087,159
1,089,458
1,950,205
1,253,494
7,606,072
12,185,721
7,340,653
Spain • Torrente 1 (El bra-
zo tonto de la ley)
• Torrente 2 (Misión
en Marbella)
• Torrente 3 
(El protector)
1998
2001
2005
S. Segura
S. Segura
S. Segura
2,849,259
5,299,617
3,573,244
29,436
0
0
2,878,695
5,299,617
3,573,244
• Mortadelo y 
Filemón 1 (La 
gran aventura…)
• Mortadelo y File-
món 2 
(Misión: salvar…)
2001
2007
J. Fesser
M. Bardem
4,980,281
1,218,386
80,851
n/a
5,061,132
1,218,386
Italy
• Natale 1 (Vacanze
di Natale ‘95)
• Natale 2 
(Natale sul Nilo)
• Natale 3 
(Natale sul India)
• Natale 4 
(Natale a Miami)
• Natale 5 (Natale a
New York)
1995
2002
2003
2005
2006
N. Parenti
N. Parenti
N. Parenti
N. Parenti
N. Parenti
859,516
5,742,264
3,723,693
3,767,813
2,947,812
0
62,876
0
0
0
859,516
5,805,140
3,723,693
3,767,813
2,947,812
6.4. Pan-European Public and Private Financial Initiatives
With the same tendency of emulation, Europe is trying to encourage the
increase of financial support for the film industry, both from public and
private funds, in order to compete with Hollywood big budgets. As
mentioned earlier, the financing situation of the European film industry
tends to be fragile and inconsistent for many producers due to the lack
of regular and efficient financing sources, especially from private capital
funds. For this very reason, some well-oriented initiatives have been
accomplished during the last decades. On the one hand, the European
Union has developed specific aid programs at many levels. On the other,
some European countries have promoted attractive tax-shelter schemes,
favoring some risk-capital firms to invest in film financing.
On the public side, the European Union has been regularly supporting
the film industry on a multinational scale, thanks to well-known
schemes like Eurimages and Media programs aimed at production,
distribution and exhibition. Since its establishment in 1989, Eurimages
has supported 1,142 European co-productions for a total amount of
more than € 334 million (an average € 15-20 million per year), in
addition to supporting distribution and exhibition of European films
across Europe. On its part, Media Program has been very active in
providing funds for preproduction and post-production activities
(including distribution and promotion). The budget for the current
edition (Media 2007-13) is up to € 755 million, spread out over seven
years (the previous budget being as much as € 453.6 million). Despite
this strong injection of money, the efficiency of the results is still in
question (Henning & Alpar, 2005: 248-249).
Attracting private investment remains a vital part of the film financing
formula and even generous production incentives from government
make up only part of the equation. In any case, tax shelter legislation is
being a ‘hot topic’ in Europe nowadays. After the UK and German recent
changes, every government is being watchful of tax leakage and there is
a general push across Europe at the moment to close off tax avoidance.
There has been a change in the language and emphasis in the film
finance world, turning away from tax and towards finding ways to make
film an attractive investment and, more importantly, a sustainable
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investment. In UK, for instance, the easy money schemes of the sale and
leaseback era have been substituted by ‘Gaap partnerships’, where
investors have the opportunity to defer tax payments on a loan-supported
investment by writing down expected losses on a film production.
Netherlands, as another case, has now come up with a ‘matching fund’
scheme to allow producers with two-thirds of their budget in place to
apply for the final third of their film’s financing (Gubbins, 2007c).
According to these policies, some European regional governments are
offering generous sums of money to attract film shootings in their
respective territories (mainly European co-productions, although some
also include US runaway productions). This is very much the case of
Germany, the most active country in this sense. For instance, in 2006
regional public fund Filmstiftung NRW distributed over US$ 9.3
million (€ 7 million) to 29 German-European co-productions. Three
other German regional public funds, FFF Bayern, FilmFoerderung
Hamburg and MDM, supported 6 films with a total amount of US$ 5.3
million (€ 4 million) for 6 films. Finally, Medienboard Berlin-
Brandenburg put US$ 9.3 million (€ 7 million) for another 26 co-
productions (Blaney, 2006a, 2007b, 2007g). In addition, in 2007,
thanks to the currently boom in national and international production,
the Berlin Senate has announced plans to make US$ 85 million (€ 60
million) available until 2013 for state-backed guarantees to boost
region’s attractiveness for film productions. Similarly, other state-
backed guarantee schemes for the film industry in other German
federal states, like Brandenburg and Saxony.
On top of that, in January 2007, German Government launched the
German Federal Film Fund (DFFF) with an annual budget of U$ 81.9
million (€ 60 million) for the next three years. The fund reimburses 20
cents of every euro spent in Germany up to a maximum of 80% of a
qualifying film’s total production costs. At present, there is a cap of
US$ 5.5m (€ 4 million) on the amount that can be awarded to a single
project, although this can be increased to US$ 13.6 million (€ 10
million) if the German spend amounts to at least 35% of a film’s total
production costs. While some German producers are privately critical
of the big studio projects attracting large sums of DFFF cash, one of
the fund’s stated aims is to promote Germany’s international
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competitiveness for location and studio shoots –as it has been the case
of many of the recent Hollywood ‘runaway productions’. The potential
of the DFFF for the wider German economy has already been
recognized and the Government is thinking of extending the fund
beyond the present cut-off period of 2009 (Blaney, 2007d).
In a similar way, the Italian regions of Lazio and Piedmont have
allocated important sums of money to be handed out to international co-
producers who shoot in their regions: as much as US$ 12.8 million (€
10 million) in the case of Lazio, and over twice that figure, US$ 33.1
million (€ 25 million), in the case of Piedmont. Turin, Friuli Venezia
Giulia and the island of Sardinia are also operating film funds (Rodier,
2006; Jennings, 2007). On its part, the Irish government has pledged
US$ 188 million (€ 145 million) to support the Irish Film Board’s work
until 2013, one of its main tasks being to market Ireland as film location
(Screen Daily, 2007d). Finally, Norwegian Government has decided to
strength its film policy by creating a new film institute, with a US$ 6.1
million (€ 4.6 million) support budget (Rossing Jensen, 2007a).
On the private hedge money side, some representatives of the
European film industry have been calling for the adaptation of the
recent US private equity investment initiatives on this side of the
Atlantic. Effectively, the US film industry has benefited in recent years
from institutional funding worth US$ 9 billion. This includes the US$
500 million deal between Legendary Pictures and Warner Brothers, the
US$ 490 million agreement between The Weinsteins Company and
Goldman Sachs, as well as the US$ 600 million contract between
Relativity Media and Sony and Universal. This new formula is also
being applied on a lesser scale to independents. Michael London’s
Groundswell Productions, for instance, closed a US$ 205 million deal
with global investment firm TPG-Axon Capital. And Montecito
Picture Co., run by Tom Pollock and Ivan Reitman, sealed a US$ 200
million deal with Merrill Lynch (Brass, 2007a).
These financial agreements had never been possible without the banks’
involvement. Banks have long been involved in film financing on a
smaller scale, but now they are also taking major stakes at these slate-
financing deals, marking a key change in the banking community’s
attitude towards an industry that has often been regarded as too risky
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for big-money involvement. According to some reports, within the last
two years approximately, more than US$ 11 billion has been raised for
the film industry through slate financing, and another US$15 billion
will be raised within the next year, with around US$ 10 billion of it
coming from banks (Brass, 2007b). Conversely, the negative effect is
that whereas banks’ involvement in huge slate-financing deals has been
growing, their activity in more traditional hunting grounds in the film
industry has reduced. According to the same report, banks’
participation in single-picture financing and project financing has
declined sharply, particularly in the last year.
In this sense, some European banks are being also more active in trying
to position themselves for the possible development of a thriving
equity-funding market for Hollywood studios and also for the local
film industry. This is the case of the French Societé Générale, the
Scottish Royal Bank and the German bank Dresdner Kleinwort, as
already mentioned. The latter, apart from investing in Hollywood
through its deal with Paramount, is willing to establish a new private
equity wave worth US$ 100-130 million slate-financing aimed at
institutional investors. Given that there are no entities on the
Hollywood scale in Europe, they are trying to create a multi-company
slate of 18-30 films pooling the bigger independent European projects.
As a final example, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank recently
pulled out of a commitment to underwrite a US$ 1 billion Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM) slate deal in the wake of a credit crunch in
global markets. The planned deal aims to attract private equity, hedge
fund and institutional investors to back MGM productions and co-
productions (Brass, 2007a; Gubbins, 2007b; Screen Daily, 2007b).
Also in the private sector, the Belgian media fund Motion Picture
Investment Group (MIG) raised US$ 21.4 million (€ 16.5 million) to
back 18 films in 2006. This company was founded in 2005 following
the creation of tax shelter legislation by the Belgian government one
year earlier (Screen Daily, 2007a). In Germany, the film financing and
fund management group Entertainment Value Associates (EVA)
decided to acquire a majority interest in the Munich-based family-run
sales company Atlas International Film through its subsidiary EVA
Finance. The sales outfit manages a catalogue of more than 500 titles.
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In addition, EVA’s co-shareholder Odeon Film acquired a majority
stake in the film & TV production company Hofmann & Voges
Entertainment and launched Hanover-based Waterfall Productions to
specialise in the production of quality genre feature films with small to
medium budgets for the international market (Blaney, 2007f).
6.5. Pan-European Film Distribution Attempts
As mentioned in the third chapter, distribution is the weakest sector of
the European film industry. The low level of vertical integration makes
quite hard the development of integrated strategies for commercial
exploitation. US distributors control the market access and European
producers are usually in a difficult position in the battle for screen
time. The necessity for a strong distribution infrastructure has been a
constant challenge for the film industry in Europe.
In this sense, many European companies are seeking to form pan-
European connections to increase their leverage with Hollywood. By
controlling multiple territories under one umbrella they can approach
majors from a more powerful position, offering the ability to access and
distribute across several different markets all at once. Still, efforts to
form multinational conglomerates between European companies have
proved difficult (Jäckel, 2003: 99-100; Buquet, 2005: 279-280).
Different European countries still have very different business customs,
and the strain can be very great (Lange, Newman-Baudais, & Hugot,
2007: 9). European companies often cannot recoup expensive failures
or handle instability as well as the Hollywood majors. Thus, last years
have seen the remains of failed pan-European ventures littering the
industry landscape, from PolyGram and Signpost to the Kirch-
Mediaset-Epsilon venture and countless smaller ones (Rodier, 2001). 
More recently, the French sales and financing outfit Wild Bunch set up
a new distribution subsidiary intentionally named Pan-Europeenne
intended to distribute big budget films of all nationalities.
Nevertheless, it must be said that among the partners of this joint-
venture there is an unnamed American group not previously involved
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in cinema. In addition, the French company announced its intention to
buy other distribution companies in Western European countries, as a
strategy to establish a European distribution network. Effectively, few
months ago, Wild Bunch and German Senator Entertainment agreed to
form a joint distribution venture in Germany as part of a broader
agreement that will see the partners collaborate on co-productions and
financing. This distribution deal comes after Wild Bunch acquired 50%
of Senator’s shares of distribution subsidiary Central Film Verleih
GmbH. With this move, Wild Bunch has already taken hold in France,
Italy and the Benelux territories, apart from Germany (Tartaglione-
Vialatte, 2005b; Kay, 2007h). On a much more lesser scale, the Swiss
Omega Entertainment has also been acting as a pan-European rights
trader before upgrading to the global scale after its agreement with an
American partner (Kay, 2007b).
Connecting these two last trends –seeking formulas for private hedge
funds and attempts to control European distribution– we can draw
attention to an emerging phenomenon, and this is the mergers and
partnerships between European production and distribution
companies, in the need to scale up and compete with their Hollywood
counterparts. One recent example has been the merger of two of the
most relevant production-distribution companies in Europe, the French
Celluloid Dreams (run by Hengameh Panahi) and the British HanWay
(run by Jeremy Thomas). The resulting company, Dreamachine, has
become one of the world’s leading groups in film sales and potentially,
one of the leading European distributors as well (Macnab, Mitchell, &
Gubbins, 2007). In a similar move, German distributor Kinowelt has
recently founded its production arm, Neue Kinowelt Filmproduktion
(NKF), aimed to become involved in between three-to-five co-
productions a year and two-to-three in-house projects as well as
working on TV movie commissions from German public and private
broadcasters. All of the cinema films will be released in Germany by
Kinowelt’s theatrical arm Kinowelt Filmverleih and on DVD by
Kinowelt Home Entertainment (Screen Daily, 2007c).
Other example of this attempt to create stronger alliances on a
multinational level within Europe is the recent launching of a new
production-distribution company by German FremantleMedia,
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through its German subsidiary UFA, and the RTL Group. The new
outfit, UFA Cinema, is aimed to deliver feature films for the local
market. Plans are also in place to eventually establish an in-house
theatrical distribution infrastructure. According to the UFA CEO, Wolf
Bauer, this move is the first step towards the establishment of further
film production companies in other European markets, like France and
Spain, as the base for a European major studio (Blaney, 2007e).
6.6. Promoting National / Local Cinema
Finally, another tack European filmmakers take in relation to
Hollywood is to create content that doesn’t compete directly with
Hollywood blockbusters but, rather, aims at finding a distinctly local
audience by creating smaller films that cater to local tastes. These
small-scale ‘country specific’ films are becoming an important basis
for the sector as it looks to differentiate its product from Hollywood.
As Higson points out, this effort to produce a distinctively national
cinema focused on indigenous cultural traditions and identities implies
the problem of the domestic markets’ modest size and, as a
consequence, the correlative budgetary limitations. For this reason,
film companies working on this front have specialized in catering for
niche audiences (Higson, 2000: 241).
Taking into account the difficulty European films have in crossing
borders, these films are designed to earn their money back within their
local markets. They aim to appeal to audiences through their treatment
of local themes, using local stars and local languages to take advantage
of territory unfilled by American Hollywood blockbusters (Guider &
McNary, 2006). They are far cheaper –and therefore far less risky–
than big international films, and in rare cases local hits can turn into
international phenomena, earning huge profits for their producers as
happened with Britain’s Billy Elliot (2000), France’s Amelie (2001),
Germany’s Goodbye Lenin! (2003), Czech Republic’s Empties (2007),
or Spain’s El orfanato (The Orphanage, 2007). Table 13 includes some
of the recent European ‘national’ hits. Current trends in film markets
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all over the world show a renewed interest for local films. According
to Screen Digest, domestic films accounted for one third of film
revenue worldwide in 2006 (Screen Digest, 2007c).
Table 13. 
Examples of European ‘National’ Hits
Source: Own elaboration on EAO (Lumiere Database).
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Coun-
try
Title Year Director Domestic Admiss.
EU (25)
US Total
Spain
El otro lado
de la cama
2002 E. Mtnez. 
Lázaro
2,804,999 2,895,053 : 5,700,052
Mar adentro 2004 A. Amenábar 3,998,550 1,143,750 306,154 5,448,454
El orfanato 2007 J.A. Bayona 4,363,856 : : 4,363,856
UK
Billy Elliot 2000 S. Daldry 3,893,407 12,266,304 4,017,320 20,177,031
Bend It Like
Beckham
2002 G. Chadha 2,441,074 2,286,909 9,840,135 4,727,983
Love Actually 2003 R. Curtis 7,543,045 15,745,910 5,396,923 12,939,968
France Amelie 2001 J.P. Jeunet 9,290,535 20,696,885 5,931,234 35,918,654
Chouchou 2003 M. Allouache 3,800,000 3,937,287 : 7,737,287
Le Chorists 2004 C. Barratier 8,360,000 10,128,760 324,798 18,813,558
Ger-
many
Der Schuh
des Manitou
2001 M. Herbig 11,719,16
9
2,562,410 : 14,281,579
Goodbye, 
Lenin
2003 W. Becker 6,574,961 10,498,297 654,428 17,727,686
(T)Raumschiff
Surprise 1
2004 Michael Her-
big
9,150,736 1,221,257 : 10,371,993
Italy
L’ultimo 
bacio
2001 G. Muccino 3,153,779 544,277 : 3,698,056
Natale in 
India
2003 N. Parenti 3,723,693 3,723,693 : 7,447,386
Il paradiso 
all’improvviso
2003 L. Pieraccioni 4,777,342 50,719 : 4,828,061
Czech
R.
Empties 2007 J. Sverak 1,254,282 : : 1,254,282
Greece Politiki kouzina
2003 T, Boulmetis : 556,767 : 556,767
Den-
mark 
Italiensk for
begyndere
2000 L. Scherfig 819,553 2,775,021 767,719 4,362,293
Turkey G.O.R.A 2004 O.F. Sorak 3,932,315 360,178 : 4,292,493
Roma-
nia
4 luni, 3 
saptamâni si
2 zile
2007 C. Mungui : : : :
These films usually trade on the areas of the film market left
unsatisfied by Hollywood exports. Comedy is the most prominent
example, since it is one of the most local genres and has proved the
most stubbornly difficult for Hollywood to export (Groves, 1999). A
large percentage of the most successful local European films employ
locally popular comedians, for example. This is the case of the
Torrente saga in Spain, the Natale franchise in Italy, Les Bronzés in
France, or titles like Der Schuh des Manitou and (T)Raumschiff
Surprise 1 in Germany.
Local filmmakers can also take advantage of cultural differences
between America and Europe by addressing some topics that are not
political corrected in Hollywood. Some recent examples are Danish
After the Wedding (Efter brylluppet, 2006), directed by Susan Bier and
nominated for Best Foreign Film, and Romanian 4 Months, 3 Weeks, 2
Days (4 luni, 3 saptamâni si 2 zile, 2007), directed by Christian
Mungui and winner of the Palm d’Or at Cannes 2007.
Local films deal with social or historical issues that affect their home
audiences but do not grasp Hollywood’s attention. Spain found success
with their ETA terrorism based El Lobo and Germany’s Goodbye
Lenin! and The Lives of Others (Das Leben der Anderen, 2006),
dealing with post-Soviet unification, pulled in huge revenues. The
Second World War is also a revisited genre of increasing popularity, as
can be seen with Life is Beautiful (La vita e bella, 1999) in Italy, The
Downfall (Der Utergang, 2004) and Sophie Scholl: The Final Days
(Sophie Scholl: Die Letzen Tage, 2005) in Germany, The Back Book
(Zwartboek, 2006) in Netherlands, and Days of Glory (Indigènes,
2006) in France.
Nevertheless, as was explained before, Hollywood has learnt the
business potential of local-language cinema and most of the majors
have created special divisions aimed at increasingly investing in
national films through the co-production formula (Kay, 2007a).
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7. Conclusions and Discussion
It is time to make some concluding remarks and offer some thoughts
for further discussion.
As was recalled in the first chapter, the history of the relationship
between Europe and Hollywood has been one of ‘love’ and ‘hate’.
Nowadays, thanks to the new global economy as well as the
internationalization of resources and markets, it has become a
‘marriage of convenience’. In fact, as explained with some detail and
numerous examples in the previous two sections, this peculiar romance
is sustained by paradoxical strategies of cooperation on one hand and
competition on the other –especially in the case of Europe.
This dialectic set of tactics between Europe and Hollywood clearly
resembles, in my opinion, the “two-way traffic [and] asymmetrical
dynamic of exchange” referred to by Elsaesser, as well as the “local
and global relations of reciprocity and competition” mentioned by
Scott. In addition, they form part of those “increasing number of
variables [which flow] between the Hollywood center and the
periphery”, in Newman’s words.
Therefore, regarding our first hypothesis, we can properly define the
current Europe-Hollywood relationship as a form of coopetition, as it
is understood by business management theory and especially
according to Yadong Luo’s proposals. Effectively, both film industries
work together to collectively enhance performance by sharing
resources (capital, production facilities, talents) and committing to
common tasks goals in some domains (mainly Europe). At the same
time, they compete by taking independent actions in their domestic and
international film markets. This is noticeable in the case of Europe,
combining protectionist measures and competitive strategies. In other
words, Europe needs Hollywood’s production and distribution
machinery as well as its business expertise. At the same time,
Hollywood needs European money and creativity, apart from a
significant share of the European film market.
Nevertheless, since the Hollywood and the European film industries
cannot be considered as single multinational companies, Luo’s
theories can only be applied in an analogical way. Being so, they are
still useful to explain the current business strategies developed by some
key players from both film industries.
Responding to our second hypothesis, we should stress that among the
different types of coopetition described by Luo, the consideration of
Hollywood and Europe as global rivals fits especially well. According
to this author, this kind of coopetition views the relationship “as a
simultaneous, inclusive interdependence containing cooperation and
competition as two separate yet interrelated continua” (Luo, 2004: 12).
At the same time, “the interdependence entails competing and
collaborating elements, with rivalry as well as collaborative aims, vis-
à-vis each other, in the course of winning global reach, expansion and
profit” (ibid.). Finally he adds that competition and cooperation
between global rivals coexist “because they realize the potential of
synergy (financial, technological or operational) creation through
cooperation but meanwhile they encounter conflicts arising from
different goals, rivalry instinct and resource bargaining and they face
certain zero-sum conditions in market competitions” (ibid.: 13).
According to my view, the previous description of strategies developed
by Europe and Hollywood very much exemplifies this reality.
Explaining the cooperation between global rivals in greater depth, Luo
asserts that:
It is not limited merely to cooperative alliances such as international
joint ventures, outsourcing agreements, licensing or franchising, R&D
consortia, co-production and co-marketing, but extended to all types of
collective efforts such as improving a host country’s industry
infrastructure, pressing local authorities for market access or fair
competition, uniting together against uncompensated leakage of
proprietary knowledge to local firms, sharing common suppliers or
global distribution channels, and forming clusters for production,
development, or supply resources at home and abroad (ibid.: 12).
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I do think that many of the strategies described above are good
examples of this business strategy. Effectively, the Hollywood and the
European film industries have not only been relying on joint ventures,
distribution and co-production agreements, exchanges of talent and
creativity or outsourcing production agreements (runaway
productions), but also the local industry infrastructure has benefited
–at least in the European case– forming clusters for production and
development, sharing resources and global distribution channels.
Regarding some peculiarities of this form of coopetition, we should
recall Luo’s enumeration of features. In the first place, he notes the
coexistence of cooperation and competition between the same global
rivals, and these opposed strategies must occur at the same time. In our
case, this is what happens: Hollywood and Europe cooperate and
compete with each other at the same time. Nevertheless, I should point
out that it does not occur under the rules of balance, as happens with
many multinational companies when they join forces. If coopetition
between multinational companies usually requires a sort of parity, this is
not the case of the film industry on both sides of the Atlantic. From the
industry point of view, the production and distribution power of
Hollywood studios is still hardly matched by the European film
companies. From the market perspective, American movies dominate by
far European screens, whereas European cinema is scarcely present on
American screens. In other words, there is a significant –and probably
insuperable– difference between these two coopetitors.
Secondly, no explains that rivals associated with coopetition could be
either foreign or local, but they must compete in global markets. Here
we find another significant difference. In our case, the cooperative and
competitive strategies developed by Europe and Hollywood do not
take place on the international markets –like Asia or Latin America–
nor even on both domestic territories (US and Europe), but only within
the European borders. Europe has become the main battlefield so far
for the coopetition strategy. The effect of it outside the European
borders is still unnoticeable.
Finally, Luo points out that coopetition differs from the mere
cooperative alliance between global rivals and may occur at corporate,
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division or subsidiary levels, depending on strategic intents and
organizational needs. Both features apply in the case of the Europe-
Hollywood relationship, especially at the company level.
Although I have stressed so far the convenience of considering the
Europe-Hollywood coopetition from the perspective of global rivalry,
I must admit that a sort of hybrid model, drawn from the four types
described by Luo, could also be considered. Effectively, the different
cooperative and competitive strategies explained on the previous pages
illustrate not only the role of Hollywood and Europe as global rivals,
but also the importance of foreign governments dealing with US
companies. In the same way, some American-European initiatives
could be considered as a coopetitive alliance of international partners,
and we could also underline the existence of coopetition at the
corporate level within multinational enterprises, as is the case with the
Hollywood majors’ subsidiaries in Europe.
With regard to our third hypothesis, it can be concluded that the
center-periphery model used by Newman for explaining the dynamic
flows between Hollywood and non-Hollywood film industries fits
particularly well in the case of Europe. All the main elements he
identifies in this feedback movement are also present here: the flow
of technical and creative talent (not only actors or directors, but also
composers, directors of photography, art directors or special-effects
technicians), the Hollywood productions shot on European soil (both
in Western and Central-Eastern countries), the exchange of financial
and intellectual exchange (monies and ideas), and the local
government’s policies –not only restrictive (screen quotas) but also
incentive (tax-shelter schemes). It is important in my view to insist
on the asymmetry in this two-way traffic, as Elsaesser does. The
intensity of ‘flood’ is sensibly different depending of the direction
(from Hollywood to Europe or the other way around) and the
variables in place. And not always is there a corresponding feedback.
For instance, many European film directors and actors who break
into the Hollywood system do not return to their country of origin
afterwards –they belong to the ‘international talent’ status. However,
the financial exchange, as seen, can be more balanced and mutually
beneficial.
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I am quite conscious of the limitations that some of these conclusions
have, especially when considering Europe as ‘one country’, ‘one
industry’ and ‘one market’ suitable for comparison with the US as a
whole, without taking into account the fragmented but at the same time
enriching reality of their different idiosyncrasies. Nevertheless, I do
think this premise permits one to gain an interesting wider picture of
both territories, struggling to be present on the international arena and
fighting to control the entertainment industry worldwide. Although
there are partial researches on the influence of Hollywood in particular
European countries (like the ones included in the volume co-edited by
McDonald and Wasko), this book –and, more particularly, the set of
strategies described here– pretends to serve as a blueprint for further
studies, either applied to specific territories (the way in which these
cooperative and competitive strategies take place in a given European
country) or to specific issues (runaways productions, distribution
strategies, European blockbusters or franchises in European cinema).
To conclude, I would like to offer some other thoughts for discussion,
in an attempt to forecast the future shape of the global film industry,
where the Europe-Hollywood coopetition is going to play a significant
role –together with the Asia-Hollywood coopetition and, on a lesser
scale, the Europe-Latin America coopetition.
In my view, the future for both industries rests on a mixed model of
‘international picture’, often designed as a co-production –either
financial or creative– between two apparent contenders, aimed at the
worldwide market and including talent and capital from everywhere.
Recent examples are Alexander (2004), a US-EU (French-German-
Dutch) co-production, directed by an American top director (Oliver
Stone), shot in Thailand and Morocco at Warner’s initiative, with an
international cast and post-produced in France (EAO, 2005a: 4); the
last Coppola film, Youth Without Youth (2007) a co-production
between American Zoetrope and Pathé, shot in Bucarest with lines in
six European languages –Sanskrit included– (Tartaglione, 2005);
and, finally, the participation of KanZaman a Spanish production
company, in a Hollywood sequel, Basic Instinct 2 (2006) (Green,
2005a). At the same time, of course, it will be important to promote
idiosyncrasies. Not only will market fragmentation permit or demand
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both, but also small local films will be ranked at the top box office
from time to time as well.
In this sense, even on the conceptual side, some authors like Thomas
Elsaesser propose to replace the traditional duality of ‘European
movies’ versus ‘Hollywood movies’ with the unique and generic term
of ‘World Cinema’ (Elsaesser, 2005: 485-511). As we have mentioned
before, not only is Hollywood producing European national films, but
also the number of European ‘blockbusters’ aimed at the international
market is growing to the point of becoming a standard. The promotion
of these “national-international films”, as Elsaesser named them (ibid.:
506) together with the creation of “global branding” and the appearance
of the “international cinemagoer”, as described by Acland (Acland,
2003: 11) are transforming the current film market. In this sense, the
borders between the US and the European film industries are becoming
blurred. As a consequence, the film production strategies will be
ordered according to a new “more polycentric and more polyglot
audiovisual landscape”, as Scott has pointed out (Scott, 2005: 171). 
In this regard, the difficulties that some European movies have faced
in being considered as ‘national’ films in their own countries are also
very significant of this new order. This is the case, as is well known,
of the French film A Very Long Engagement (2004) –which obliged
the authorities to change the subsidies policy in France, due to its US
finance– or the Italian movie Private (2004) which was disqualified
as an Italian representative for the Oscars® for being spoken in
Arabic, Hebrew and English only (Tartaglione-Vialatte, 2005a;
Rodier, 2005b).
Will the Hollywood’s dominance on the world film markets change in
this near future? Probably no. As Scotts suggests, “[o]ver the last
century, Hollywood has displayed remarkable durability, and it will
doubtless continue to do so on the basis of its accumulated sunk
costs…, its potent internal synergies, and its enormous creative
energies” (Scott, 2005: 175). Nevertheless, as he also speculates, “as
other cultural-products agglomerations continue their rise around the
world, Hollywood is also likely to face intensifying competition whose
net result may well be some erosion of the disproportionate dominance
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on the international markets” (ibid.). On the contrary, other authors
defend that, “rather than erode Hollywood’s power as the center of the
international commercial film and television industry, the
externalization of production could very well reinforce Hollywood’s
global dominance”, because “[a]s countries increase the economic
benefits they derive from Hollywood’s hegemony, they are less likely
opposed politically to American films’ box-office dominance” (Elmer
& Gasher, 2005: 15). Two imponderables must be kept in mind in this
regard, according to Scott. On the one hand, it cannot be taken for
granted that “producers of motion pictures and policy makers in other
parts of the world will seize the opportunities that now lie before
them”; and on the other, “producers in Hollywood will hit upon a fresh
trump card… that carries them forward to new rounds of commercial
and cultural supremacy over their actual and potential rivals in other
places” (ibid.).
In any case, the movie industry will achieve a further international
development in the years to come, thanks to globalization and the
digital revolution. Hollywood majors will convert the filmmaking
industry into a progressively more worldwide business, through the
exchange of capital, talent and resources of any sort. In a similar way,
some European film companies will build up more international
synergies aimed at being more present in Hollywood and at tightening
links with former colonies –especially in the case of France, Spain and
Portugal– to create language-oriented markets.
In summary, the relationship between Europe and Hollywood will
evolve in this scenario, adopting new forms but without avoiding the
cooperation-competition dynamic. Using another analogy, it is as if the
European film industry needed these two movements of cooperation
and competition –as opposed as they are– to keep on breathing, like the
inhalation-exhalation routine. And Hollywood knows that “Europe has
always been the ‘hidden half’ of the American film equation. The
Majors… have always been highly dependent on European talent and
revenues”, as Martin Dale concludes (Dale, 1997: x). The quid of the
question, of course, is to determine up to what point this ‘marriage of
convenience’ is really based on mutual reciprocity or if it could be
described more like a kind of ‘sleeping with the enemy’ situation. 
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